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WITHHOLDING AND
WITHDRAWING LIFE SUPPORT
FROM ADULTS AT COMMON LAW©
By JOAN M. GILMOUR*
This article examines the circumstances in which life support can legally be
withheld or withdrawn from adults. It analyzes the situation of patients who
are both capable and incapable of making decisions, taking into account recent
jurisprudence in Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Where
competence is not an issue, both law and modem medicine espouse a strong
normative commitment to patient self-determination. However, when no clear
indication of the patient's treatment preference can be ascertained because of
decisional incapacity, then the question of terminating life support is much
more difficult. The author describes and analyzes the two legal standards that
have evolved in the three countries to guide treatment decisions: the
substituted judgment standard, which has been particularly prominent in the
United States, and the best interests test. Both have been problematic in
application. With respect to the best interests test prevalent in Canada, the
few analogous cases that have been decided to date have been marked by an
emphasis on the single criterion of the presence or absence of non-relievable
pain. The author concludes that while judgments will rightly be rooted in
caution, Canadian courts can and ought to develop a more encompassing
series of considerations to ground decisions about ending life support. The
author then begins to develop principles that could guide decision making in
this area.
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I. 1NTRODUCTION
Advances in medical technology in the last thirty years have
made it possible to sustain life for extended periods of time in situations
where not long ago, death would have been a certainty. This new
capability is particularly apparent when one considers "life support"
technologies, that is, artificial means of sustaining life through the
support of the body's needs, including respiration, circulation, nutrition,
and waste disposal. To take just a few examples, it was only in the 1960s
that cardiopulmonary resuscitation and total parenteral nutrition
(complete intravenous feeding) were introduced and that the use of
modern ventilators outside operating and recovery rooms became
widespread.1 It was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that
governments in Canada and the United States funded dialysis
extensively, making it accessible for the first time to large numbers of
those in need.2 With these changes in life-sustaining medical
1 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Life-Sustaining Technologies and the Elderly
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987) at 40-41 and 428 [hereinafter Life-
Sustaining Technologies].
2 In Ontario, haemodialysis and peritoneal dialysis were included in the Ontario Medical
Services Insurance Plan, which came into existence in 1966 (correspondence from S. Davidson,
Legal Services Branch, Ministry of Health (2 July 1992)). Relative to the United States, see G.
Calabresi & P. Bobbitt, Tragic Choices (New York. W.W. Norton, 1978) at 235 and note 118, noting
the 1972 Social Security amendments in that country extending Medicare to cover the costs of
haemodialysis.
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technologies have come other changes as well, perhaps most significantly
in the type and number of patients who are considered for and placed on
life supportO Technology originally developed to support potentially
curable patients through crisis has been extended to patients with far less
favourable prognoses.
Increasingly, though, life-sustaining technologies that were
originally welcomed wholeheartedly are now viewed with some
reservation. Clinical and personal experience with various forms of life
support has demonstrated that they do not offer a panacea to all. While
it is true that life support has saved many lives, it is also true that it is
frequently ineffective and is associated with high mortality4 and
numerous potentially serious complications. 5 Life support can in some
instances keep patients who are terminally ill alive for longer than would
otherwise be possible, and can maintain some patients who are in a
3 Life-Sustaining Technologies, supra note 1 at 1. By way of example, see ibid at 428, noting
that when modem mechanical ventilators first became available outside operating and recovery
rooms in the United States in the 1960s, each major hospital usually had just one intensive care unit,
to which patients were admitted only if they seemed likely to recover in the judgment of the LC.U.
director and the family physician. Now, the capacity to provide ventilation, the settings in which it
can be instituted and maintained, the types of patients who are ventilated, and the conditions from
which they suffer have all expanded greatly. For comments on other such changes, see iba at 44.
4 Either immediately, or in the sense that the patient does not survive to be discharged from
hospital. See, for example, R. Van Hoeyweghen et aL, "Survival After Out-of-Hospital Cardiac
Arrest in Elderly Patients" (1992) 21:10 Annals Emerg. Med. 1179 at 1181; M.S. Eisenberg, A.
Hallstrom & L. Bergner, "Long-term Survival After Out-of-Hospital Cardiac Arrest" (1982) 306 N.
Eng. J. Med. 1340.
5 For descriptions of the clinical outcomes of some of the most common forms of life support
and the effects both on patients' mental and physical functioning and psychological outcomes and
on patients' families and caregivers, see Life-Sustaining Technologies,supra note 1, c. 5-9.
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persistent vegetative state6 or who are barely conscious 7 for extended
periods of time-as much as twenty to thirty years.8 More and more,
however, questions are being raised as to whether this is a desirable end.
To many people, medicine's ability to maintain existence under such
conditions is a mixed blessing, or no blessing at all.
Doctors and other health care workers, family members,
hospitals, and long-term care institutions have all been grappling for
years with questions about when life support should be provided, to
whom, for how long, and the basis on which such decisions should be
made. Medical knowledge and technology are evolving so rapidly,
however, that the law often trails behind technological developments.
Many of the legal issues entailed in withholding and withdrawing life
support have never been considered by Canadian courts, although they
have come before courts elsewhere, particularly in the United States.9 It
seems only a matter of time-and not much time, at that-before
6 See Crazan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health 110 S. Ct. 2841 at 2845, note 1 (1990)
[hereinafter Cruzan], Renquist J.: "Persistent vegetative state" refers generally to "a condition in
which the person exhibits motor reflexes, but evinces no indication of significant cognitive function."
The condition has been described as follows in S. Martyn & H. Bourguignon "Coming to Terms
with Death" (1991) 42 Hastings U.. 817 at 819, note 7:
Patients in a persistent vegetative state (Pvs) can breathe, digest food, and eliminate
waste. They can open and close their eyes, suggesting periods of sleep and waking. They
can move their eyes and manifest other reflex responses to external stimuli, such as
coughing, gagging or. moving their limbs. But these patients, though occasionally
appearing to give conscious responses do not feel pain or sense their surroundings. They
have irretrievably lost consciousness.
See also President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behaviourial Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1983) at 174-81 [hereinafter President's Commission].
7 The term "barely conscious" is used by commentators to describe individuals who "cannot
initiate purposeful activity, whose experiences are limited to physical sensations, and whose medical
prognosis holds no reasonable chance of improvement ... they lack the cognitive capacity to interact
with others and to appreciate being alive." R. Dresser & J.A. Robertson, "Quality of Life and Non-
Treatment Decisions for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Approach" (1989) 17
Law, Medicine and Health Care 234 at 242. See also N.K. Rhoden, "Litigating Life and Death"
(1988) 102 Harv. L Rev. 375 at 403.
8 Cruzan, supra note 6 at 2845, note 1. As Brennan, J. noted in his dissenting judgment in
Cruzan at 2863: "medical technology has effectively created a twilight zone of suspended animation
where death commences while life, in some form, continues." See also Stevens J. (dissenting) at
2883 on the "alarming" ability we now have to perpetuate human existence through a highly invasive
"merger" of body and machine.
9 See, for example, Cruzan, supra note 6, in which the court considered an application by the
patient's parents to have artificial nutrition and hydration withdrawn from their daughter, a young
woman who had been in a persistent vegetative state for a number of years following an automobile
accident.
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questions about whether and when to withhold or withdraw life support
will increasingly confront our courts as well.1 The heightened profile of
this issue among health care workers and the general public,11 the recent
spate of legislative activity making provision for living wills and durable
powers of attorney,12 the American example of resorting to litigation as
one means of resolving these questions,13 the rise of advocacy groups for
the disabled and the elderly,14 and pressure on and by provincial and
federal governments to restrain burgeoning health care costs all provide
the impetus that will result in these matters being taken to court.
Whether it will be for judicial imprimatur or sanction remains to be
seen.
This article examines whether life support can legally be
withheld or withdrawn from adults, and if so, in what circumstances and
subject to what limitations. It analyzes the situation of both competent
and incompetent patients. Because there is so little law on point, it is
1 0 Indeed, the first such cases have now done so. See Rodriguez v. B.C. (A.G.), [1993] 3 S.C.R.
519 [hereinafter Rodriguez]; Nancy B. v. Hotel Dieu de Quebec (1992), 86 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (Que.
S.C.) [hereinafter Nancy B. ]. See also Manoir de la Pointe Bleue (1978) Inc. v. Corbei [1992] RJ.Q.
712 (C.S.) [hereinafter Corbeil].
11 As an indication of public interest, the Hemlock Society's Final Exi4 a guide instructing
terminally ill patients on how to commit suicide or find assistance to do so topped the New York
Tunes bestseller list when it was released and quickly sold out in Canada. See "Suicide Book a Best
Seller" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (13 August 1991) C3; "The Recipe for Suicide in a How-To
Manual" The Globe and Mail (15 August 1991) A14.
12 See, for example, Nova Scotia's Consent to Medical Treatment and Consequential
Amendments Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 279 and Manitoba's Health Care Directives Act, S.M. 1992, c.33.
In Ontario, the Substitute Decisions Act S.O. 1992, c. 30 and the companionAdvocacyAct, S.O. 1992,
c. 26 and Consent to Treatment Act, S.O. 1992, c. 31 passed third reading in the legislature in
December, 1992. It is not anticipated that these statutes will be proclaimed in force until sometime
in 1994, in order to allow time to develop the necessary administrative framework.
13 See Crzan, supra note 6 at 2888, note 21, Stevens . listing many of the state court decisions
that have considered aspects of this issue.
14 For example, an advocacy group for the disabled was instrumental in focusing an inquest
into the deaths of developmentally handicapped children at the Christopher Robin Home in
Ontario on the general issue of "comfort care" orders when such children develop other illnesses.
See "'Comfort Care' an Inquest Issue" The [Toronto] Globe & Mail (16 May 1991) A2; "Group
Criticizes Care for Disabled" The Globe & Mail (13 May 1991) A6; People First of Ontario v. Bennett
(1991), 5 0.R. (3d) 609 (Div. Ct.); rev'd on other grounds People First of Ontario v. Porter (1992), 6
O.R. (3rd) 289 (C.A.) (public interest advocacy group granted standing at inquest on basis of its
direct interest in potential jury recommendations with respect to future preventable matters). In
Quebec, the Canadian Association for Community Living sought unsuccessfully to have a provincial
investigation into the hospital death of an infant with Down's syndrome, who required an operation
to correct an intestinal blockage and from whom artificial nutrition and hydration were withheld.
"Whitewash of Infant's Death by Starvation at Montreal Children's Hospital Complete" (1990) 4
Can. H. R. Advoc. 4.
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less of a commentary on decided cases than an attempt to combine the
reasoning and principles underlying the few existing and analogous cases
with an appreciation of the moral, legal, and practical issues raised by
withholding and withdrawing life support. I use that base to suggest the
approach Canadian courts are likely to and should take.
Where competence is not an issue, both law and modern
medicine espouse a great normative commitment to the patient as an
independent, rational individual able to make free, informed choices
with respect to medical care. The requirement of obtaining the patient's
informed consent prior to treatment flows from that model. The model
itself has, however, been subject to cogent criticism, as I outline.
Nonetheless, given the countervailing forces in physician-patient
relations and in the health care system more generally, and given that in
the end, it is the patient who must bear the direct consequences of
treatment decisions, I argue that it is most appropriate for the legal
system to continue to centre on the primacy of autonomy and self-
determination. However, I suggest that while courts are increasingly
willing to give effect to the treatment choices of competent patients even
where that decision might seem unwise, there are limits on a patient's
right of self-determination, limits shaped in part by the court's ability to
understand and accept the patient's reasons for refusing treatment and
the gravity of the consequences that will follow.
Decision making when the patient is incompetent poses many
more problems. A number of provinces have passed or proposed
legislation giving legal effect to various forms of advance directives.
Devices such as living wills and durable powers of attorney for health
care are in keeping with the emphasis on patient self-determination and
autonomy that pervades current thinking on medical care. Despite
practical, legal, and philosophical difficulties, advance directives will be
useful to provide some welcome certitude in individuals' capacity to
control future care should incompetence intervene, at least for those
(likely few in number) who are both sanguine and resourceful enough to
execute them.
When the patient has never been competent or gave no clear
indication of treatment preferences while competent, determinations
about the use or continuation of life support become immensely more
difficult. Each of the two legal standards that have evolved for
terminating treatment in the United States and (to a lesser extent) in the
United Kingdom-the substituted judgment and best interests
tests-can be problematic. This is in part because the language used in
some of the decisions implementing a substituted judgment standard
makes too strong a claim for the process and its results. Courts have
478 VOL 31 No. 3
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asserted that they are acting on the (now incompetent) patient's choice
in situations where they obviously could not be, as no such "choice"
could actually have been made or identified. The Supreme Court of
Canada rejected the substituted judgment standard in another context:
the sterilization of a mentally incompetent young woman.1 5
Nonetheless, I will still argue that where there is reliable evidence of the
patient's prior competent views respecting the use of life-sustaining
treatment, these ought to govern later decision-makers. A substituted
judgment standard best effectuates that underlying principle.
As medical technology advances and the population continues to
age, there will be increasing numbers of incompetent patients for whom
a substituted judgment is not possible. Many will lack any close
associates who would be able or willing to "speak" for them. For these
patients, the best interests test remains. It poses its own problems,
stemming in part from unarticulated underlying judicial assumptions
about the task of identifying "the good" for a particular patient.
Judgments will rightly be rooted in caution. However, existing
jurisprudence in analogous areas suggests a tendency on the part of
courts to require treatment unless the patient is suffering severe pain
that cannot be alleviated. One can understand a court being reluctant to
go beyond a factor with respect to which there is a broad consensus in
society that treatment ought not to be continued. I argue that it is
possible to develop a more encompassing series of considerations to
ground decisions about life support than the single criterion of the
presence or absence of pain. Such a standard would be based on a
concern with maintaining and respecting the patient's dignity and
humanity and with preserving humaneness in treatment. It could
include the element of pain and suffering without doing injustice to
those patients for whom the presence or absence of pain is either
insignificant or ought not be the controlling value.
My focus in this article is on examining principles that could
potentially guide decision making in this area, particularly when the
patient is incompetent. Consequently, there are a number of other
aspects of the general topic which are only touched on tangentially, such
as the choice of primary decision-makers when the patient is decisionally
incapable and the appropriate standard of proof. A consideration of the
issues raised by the allocation of scarce medical resources and other such
1 5 Eve v. Mrs. E (1987), 31 D.LR. (4th) 2 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Eve].
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"macro-level" questions is also beyond the scope of the article.1 6
Rather, it tracks the individuated approach a court would take in
determining whether and how a decision can be made to dispense with
life-saving or life-prolonging treatment. It is written at a time in the
development of the law in this area when it cannot be more than a
preliminary effort-part description, part prediction, and part
prescription.
II. COMPETENT PATIENTS AND DECISIONS ABOUT LIFE
SUPPORT
Respect for the integrity and autonomy of the individual is
solidly grounded in the common law,17 and Canadian courts, borrowing
from their counterparts in the United States, have often reiterated their
acceptance of the proposition that "[e]very human being of adult years
and sound mind has the right to determine what shall be done with his
own body." 18 In fact, until the recent proclamation of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms,19 this was the only basis on which one could claim a
right to self-determination or personal inviolability in medical treatment
decisions, and in many instances, it may still be.2 0 From this
1 6 The social perception of costs and of the weight to be accorded various factors in decision
making inevitably changes depending on the format of the decision. One key variable is whether
the decision involves an identifiable subject (should this patient be provided with this particular
treatment) or is made on an aggregated, statistical basis (how much of this type of treatment should
be made available). This point is explored in more detail by Calabresi & Bobbitt, supra note 2,
examining different countries' responses in developing policies regarding access to dialysis at a time
when the scarcity and high cost of resources made treatment of chronic renal failure largely
unavailable.
17 For an early reference to this proposition, see for example, Marshall v. Curry (1933), 3
D.L.R. 260 (N.S.S.C.); more recently, see Hopp v. Lepp, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 192 [hereinafter Hopp];
Reibl v. Hughes (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Reibl]; Ciarlariello v. Schachter,
[1993] 2 S.C.R. 119.
18 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital 105 N.E. 92 at 93, Cardozo J. (N.Y. 1914). In
the Canadian context, see, for example, Reib4 ibid. at 10.
19 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
20 In a recent decision, Fleming v. Reid (1991), 4 .R. (3d) 74 (C.A.) [hereinafter Fleming], the
Ontario Court of Appeal held that patients could assert Charter rights in connection with decisions
regarding medical treatment, but in the limited context of considering the constitutionality of
certain provisions of the Mental Health Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 262 [hereinafter Mental Health Act]
regulating the provision of non-consensual psychiatric treatment. See also Rodriguez, supra note 10
(considering whether criminal prohibition on assisting suicide breached Charter rights of applicant
who was terminally ill and wished such assistance). While a detailed consideration of the
480
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fundamental proposition has grown the requirement that health-care
providers obtain the informed consent of a patient prior to treatment.
Briefly, the following prerequisites must be established for a consent to
be "informed":
i) the patient has the capacity to reason and make judgments (ie.,
is competent);
ii) the decision is made voluntarily and without coercion; and
iii) the patient has a clear understanding of the material risks and
benefits of non-treatment and of the treatment alternatives, as
well as of the disease or condition and his or her prognosis. 21
It goes without saying that the patient must be able to communicate
consent or refusal in some fashion.
While an in-depth critique of this model or a critical comparison
of its requirements with what routinely happens between a physician and
a patient is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that what is
actually accepted as fulfilling this model may differ greatly from the
process one might assume occurs. An awareness of the discrepancies
between theory and practice can affect one's assessment of the extent to
which the doctrine of informed consent actually advances the core
underlying value of individual autonomy or requires a real exercise in
self-determination. Jay Katz, an American psychiatrist and legal
academic, has argued cogently that what now seems to pass muster as
disclosure and consent in physician-patient interactions is largely
oriented by physicians towards convincing patients to accept their
recommendations. He comments that:
[s]ince the promulgation of the informed consent doctrine ... physicians have of necessity
become more aware of their new obligations to talk with patients about recommended
treatments. Yet, by and large any disclosures have been limited to informing patients
about the risks and benefits of proposed treatments, not about alternatives, and surely
not about the certainties and uncertainties inherent in most treatment options. Most
importantly, conversations with patients are not conducted in the spirit of inviting
patients to share with their physicians the burdens of decision. Without such a
commitment, dialogue is reduced to a monologue.22
application of the Charter to decisions to withdraw life support is beyond the scope of this paper, it
should be noted that the Charter may not apply to decisions regarding medical treatment where the
presence of government action is not so obvious. See Retai, Wholesale and Department Store Union
v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd. (1986), 33 D.L.R. (4th) 174 (S.e.C.) [hereinafter Dolphin Delivery];
Mcl nney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229; Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospita4
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 483.
2 1 Hopp and ReibI supra note 17.
22 J. Kaz The Silent World of Doctor and Patient (New York. Free Press, 1984) at 26. See also
R. Fox, The Sociology of Medicine (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice Hall, 1989) at 248-52 and
references cited therein. For comments to the same effect in the Canadian context, see B. Dickens,
"The Life of One's Days and the Days of One's Life" (1986-1987) 51 Sask. LR. 1 at 12.
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He also adds that:
the court's emphasis on specific disclosures, particularly of material risks, reinforces the
traditional passive mode of patients' interaction with their doctors. Risk information,
like everything else patients need to know, can become meaningful to patients only if they
are viewed as active participants in decision making.23
Additionally, work in disciplines other than law suggests that a
patient's decisions regarding treatment may be profoundly influenced by
the language used to explain the various therapies, even though the same
information is given 24 Language can be determinative in ways we do
not intuitively anticipate, and its influence on the patient's decisions may
go unrecognized.
Finally, the model of the patient as a rational, independent
"choice-maker" giving a voluntary consent to treatment has been
criticized at a much more profound level as fundamentally flawed.
Robert Burt argues that despite the great normative commitment to the
model of separate selves evident in both law and modem medicine, the
boundaries of self are not so impermeable as is assumed, particularly
where an ill patient is concerned. He regards this model as facilitating
an abdication of responsibility to the patient by decision-makers, be they
doctors or judges, and argues that there cannot and should not be
absolute role allocation resulting in a regime of "patient rule" that
presents the competent patient as the sole choice-maker and the
2 3 Katz, ibid. at 78. For responses to Katz, see (1987) 9 W. N. Eng. L J. Katz's observations
would seem to be equally applicable in Canada. A 1984 study indicated that, despite the Supreme
Court of Canada's 1980 decision in Reibl supra note 17, significantly altering the law regarding
informed consent, surgeons aware of the decision and its importance had not altered their practices
relative to the disclosure of risks to patients. Among factors guiding physician risk disclosure, a
great many physicians still ranked their own view of a patient's best interests well ahead of the fact
that the patient would probably regard the risk as relevant to his or her decision to undergo the
treatment. See G.B. Robertson, "Informed Consent in Canada: An Empirical Study" (1984) 22
Osgoode Hall LJ. 139. More recent evidence suggests that physicians are spending more time with
patients discussing the risks and benefits of treatment, largely because of fear of potential liability.
However, as the author of the study notes, "increased quantity of interactive time does not
guarantee the quality of discourse and critical information exchange." See B. Dickens, "The Effects
of Legal Liability on Health Care Providers" in Report of the Federal/Provincial/Terrilorial Review on
Liability and Compensation Issues in Health Care (Chair: J.R.S. Prichard), Liability and
Compensation in Health Care, vol. 2, Appendix B (Ottawa: 1990) at 51.
24 See B.J. McNeil et aL, "On Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies" (1982) 306
New Eng. J. Med. 1259-62. The authors note the discrepancies in patients' treatment choice when
the treatment is spoken of in terms of one's percentage chances of living rather than one's chances
of dying with that particular therapy. For similar findings relative to the significance of the language
used in the context of competent patients' decisions regarding Do Not Resuscitate Orders, see D.
Murphy, "Do Not Resuscitate Orders: Time For Re-appraisal in Long-Term-Care Institutions"
(1988) 260 J. Am. Med. Assoc. 2098 at 2099.
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physician and judge as "choice-less"-able only to implement the
patient's choice s Doing so, he argues, ignores the multiple meanings
of, and motivations for, a patient's acceptance or refusal of treatment
2 6
Much of the discussion that will follow relative to the withdrawal
of life support is premised not only on the primacy of individual self-
determination and autonomy in decision making with regard to medical
treatment (from which the doctrine of informed consent flows), but also
on the implicit assumption that for competent patients at least, informed
self-determination in refusing or consenting to treatment can and does
occur. As I have indicated, critics of the doctrine have argued
persuasively that this model may be far from descriptive of what in fact
takes place between a doctor and patient. This does not mean, however,
that we should therefore dispense with the emphasis on self-
determination found in cases considering the withdrawal of life support.
It does caution us to take with a grain of salt the claims in many of the
cases to be reviewed that the patient has made an informed, considered,
uncoerced decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment. This is
particularly so in the instance of an incompetent patient, where that
"decision" is filtered through (and some would say, inevitably distorted
by) the extra layer of a surrogate.
Returning now to the formal, legal model, it would seem to
follow that a competent patient has the right to refuse medical treatment
at will, regardless of whether the treatment would be life-sustaining or
whether death is imminent or not, and regardless of motive. However,
our courts have not always applied that principle so single-mindedly to
the exclusion of the rights and interests of others, especially when to do
so would support a patient's choice to decline life-saving medical
care-that is, in support of one whose choice will or may result in death.
Other principles and interests compete, and sometimes prevail. For
instance, a patient's pregnancy, the presence of dependent children, and
the state's interest in and obligation to preserve life have on occasion
25 P_ Burt, Taking Care of Strangers: The Rule of Law in Doctor-Patient Relations (New York-
Free Press, 1979) at 117-18 and at 136. Burt also rejects the converse, a regime of "doctor [or
judge] rule." Ibid.
26 See especially ibid. at 1-21 and at 121-23, recounting the experience of a severely burned
patient, who repeatedly asked that treatment for his bums cease so he could die, and exploring the
patient's reasons for rejecting treatment. The patient was treated despite his objections, and went
on to enrol in and successfully complete law school. Burt concludes that whether the patient's
choice was ultimately or solely other-directed or self-directed, it was very much influenced by his
interaction with those around him.
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been held to outweigh an individual's right to refuse life-saving
treatment or care 27
By way of example, in a 1984 decision, Procureur Gindral du
Canada v. H6pital Notre Dame et Niemiec,28 the Quebec Superior Court
authorized the applicant hospital to feed in whatever manner necessary
and to treat surgically a competent adult detained pending deportation
who had swallowed a piece of wire and refused all medical treatment,
stating that he preferred death to a return to his own country. The court
indicated that it would not allow Niemiec to invoke the principle of the
inviolability of his person to support his refusal of treatment. Since, in
the court's view, that principle is aimed at the protection and
preservation of life, it could not be applied to do the opposite-that is, in
support of a wish for self-destruction.29 Niemiec's right to self-
determination was subject to certain limits. Thus, although it occurs
rarely, courts have overridden a competent adult's refusal of treatment,
and not just in what might be considered the "easy" cases where the
interests of children and the state's obligations by virtue of its parens
patriae power over them are clearly implicated in the adult's decision.
Indeed, one Canadian commentator suggested that competent patients
2 7 Courts in the United States, too, have recognized a right in the competent patient to refuse
medical treatment without which he or she would surely die. However, American courts in the past
often grounded their acceptance of an individual's right to refuse treatment on a constitutional right
to privacy in addition to or instead of a common law right to self-determination. In Cruzan, supra
note 6 at 2851 and note 7, the United States Supreme Court accepted without deciding that
competent patients have a right to refuse treatment, analyzing the right as a constitutionally
protected Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest rather than as part of a generalized right to
privacy. Historically, privacy has not been constitutionally protected in Canada, and the limits on
the relatively new Charter guarantees of life, liberty, and security of the person are still being
developed. At this point, it is unclear whether Canadian courts will interpret the Charter to include
constitutional rights equivalent in effect to those recognized in the United States in this area, and, if
so, the limits to which they will be subject and the contexts in which they will apply. Given the
constitutional underpinning to many of the American decisions, it cannot be assumed that they are
automatically transferable to the Canadian situation. In the United Kingdom, courts have also
upheld patients' common law right to refuse even life-sustaining treatment (see, for example,
Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, [1993] 2 W.L.R. 359 at 367-8 (H.L.), Lord Goff [hereinafterAireda/e
Trust]; In Re T. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), [1992] 3 W.L.R. 782), but reserve the right to overrule
the decision (see, for example, In Re S. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), [1992] 3 W.LR. 806: court
ordered a caesarian section that patient had refused on religious grounds where physicians believed
both mother and child would die otherwise).
28 (1984), C.S. 426 [hereinafter Niemiec].
2 9 Ibid. at 427. Margaret Somerville notes that effectively, this "invokes an 'abuse of rights'
doctrine, which is more explicit in civilian, than in common law, legal systems." M. Somerville,
"Refusal of Medical Treatment in 'Captive' Circumstances" (1985) 63 Can. Bar Rev. 59 at 81, note
79. Echoes of the same view are evident in the judgement of Sopinka J. inRodnguez, supra note 10,
in commenting on the interpretation of the right to "life, liberty and security of the person"
guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter.
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who are hospitalized or institutionalized may be subject to something
akin to a "rescue right" in health professionals, such that a patient's
avoidable death while under the charge of a hospital need not be
tolerated. In the result, a curable patient would have no right to refuse
ordinary treatment prolonging life, at least while hospitalizedVo This
position has been rejected in later judicial decisions.3 1 Thus, while the
current common law rule may be summarized as the Law Reform
Commission of Canada has done-that is, a competent patient is the
absolute master of decisions regarding his or her own body3 2-- courts, at
least one commentator and even some provisions of the Criminal Code33
would suggest that competent patients are not necessarily master of their
own death as well their life.
Although refusal of life-prolonging or life-saving treatment by a
competent patient is not without legal difficulties, the principle of
autonomy that implicitly underpins a decision to honour such a refusal is
gaining ascendancy in this area. In the writer's view, this tendency is
both reinforced by, and a logical extension of, the increasing weight
accorded the patient's right to know and decide expressed in the concept
of informed consent to treatment. Several decisions are indicative of the
courts' growing emphasis on the principle of self-determination. In
Attorney General of B.C. v. Astaforoff,3 4 it was held that prison officials
were under no statutory duty to force-feed a competent prisoner who
chose to remain in prison on a hunger strike although free to leave on
parole. The prisoner, an elderly Doukhobor woman, had indicated that
she did not wish any measures taken to save her, even when she became
unconscious. Although the judge in the first instance acknowledged the
court's moral and legal duty to preserve the sanctity of life, he went on to
hold that that duty did not extend to requiring the necessaries of life to
be forced on an unwilling recipient. The prisoner's wishes were to be
30 B. Dickens, "The Right to Natural Death" (1981) 26 McGill UJ. 847 at 851,861 and at 876.
31 See, for example, Malette v. Shuman (1990), 72 O.R. (2d) 417 (C.A.), affg. (1987), 63 O.R.
(2d) 243 (H.C.) [hereinafter Malette], discussed infra notes 37-52 and accompanying text; and
Rodriguez supra note 10.
32 Law Reform Commission of Canada, "Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide, and the Cessation of
Treatment" (Working Paper 28) (Hull, Que.: Supply and Services Canada, 1982) at 55-56.
33 R.S.C. 1985, c. 46 [hereinafter Criminal Code]. See, for example, ss. 14,215, 219, and 241.
34 [1983] 6 W.W.R. 322 (B.C.S.C.); aff'd. [1984] 4 W.W.R. 385 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter
Astaforofl]. See also Burke v. Government of Prince Edward Island (1991), 292 A.P.R. 356
(P.E.I.S.C.), in which MacDonald CJ. dismissed the application of a prisoner awaiting trial on a
murder charge for a declaration that he had a Charter right not to be force-fed and to refuse medical
treatment. The court noted, however, that its decision did not mean the respondent had a right to
force-feed the applicant, adding that if it did so, it would run the risk of incurring liability.
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respected 5 The decision was affirmed on appeal. Questions as to
whether such a duty existed at common law rather than by statute and
whether a duty would arise if the prisoner became unconscious or
otherwise incompetent and unable to withdraw from the care and
custody of prison authorities were specifically left open. Logically,
though, ignoring her refusal of food at that point would seem to be an
absolute negation of her right of refusal and a violation of her person
and her right of bodily control, provided one was sure the refusal was
informed, voluntary, and still current, at least up to the onset of
incapacity. It may be that the different approaches taken in Niemiec and
Astaforoff can be explained by the fact that the former concerned the
hospital's power to take such action, while the latter considered only
whether prison officials were under a duty to do so. It also seems to have
been of significance that in Astaforoff, the prisoner was free to leave the
institution on parole if she chose, while in Niemiec, he had to remain
incarcerated in the custody of the state until deported, arguably both
altering and strengthening the state's interest in the preservation of his
life.36
In a 1990 decision, Malette v. Shulman,3 7 the Ontario Court of
Appeal affirmed that a refusal of blood transfusions by a Jehovah's
Witness made while competent must be honoured by a physician
treating her during a later period of incompetence following an
automobile accident. The refusal was evidenced by an undated, signed
card bearing that message, which she carried with her, and was reliably
confirmed by a close family member as having been voluntarily made
and as still expressing the patient's wishes. Mr. Justice Robins writing
for the court characterized the card as the patient's "standing orders,"
giving notice of her "firm religious conviction" in "the only practical way
35 Ib at 326-27. From the aftermath of the case, it appears that the prisoner's wishes were
respected with less ambivalence in the abstract (the judicial context) than in practice. The prisoner
was fed by a physician who volunteered his services "on humanitarian grounds" when prison
medical officers refused to do so without the prisoner's consent. During a subsequent hunger strike,
Mrs. Astaforoff was tube-fed for three days, but not after she refused further feedings. Ultimately,
she was granted a conditional pardon and released. See E. Carroll, "Forced Feeding of Prisoners:
Mary Astaforoff A Case In Point" (1983) 4 Health L Can. 85 at 86.
36 For a fuller discussion of /iemiec and a suggested distinction between cognitive and
emotional competence, see Somerville, supra note 29. For a U.S. example, see Commissioner of
Correction v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 1979), where it was held that the state's interest in
orderly prison administration outweighed any privacy interest of a prisoner who had inconsistently
(and, it was argued, manipulatively) refused dialysis.
3 7 Supra note 31.
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open to her."38 Thus, the patient's directions expressed while competent
were held to have followed her through and to govern in a later period
of incompetence, even though the evidence established that had blood
been withheld, she might very likely have died.3 9 The patient's right to
self-determination transcended any general interest of the state in
preserving life and the specific interest of the treating physician in acting
expeditiously so as to save her life in the midst of what must have
seemed at the time to be a very uncertain situation, both factually and
legally.40
In the course of its decision, the court clearly identified the rights
to self-determination and bodily integrity as the controlling values in the
doctor-patient relationship, stating that:
the right to determine what shall be done with one's own body is a fundamental right in
our society. The concepts inherent in this right are the bedrock upon which the
principles of self-determination and individual autonomy are based. 4 1
On the subject of the state's countervailing interest in preserving
life and the sanctity of life, the court proceeded on the basis that
preserving "life" meant more than maintaining physical existence,
asserting that doing so at the expense of individual free choice and self-
determination "can only lessen, and not enhance, the value of life."42
Seemingly, then, the state's interest is to be given a content that takes
into account the patient's own values as to how one's life is to be lived.
With that understanding, the interests of the individual and the state in
life-and particularly, in this patient's life-are not opposed, but
complementary.
While the court made several strong statements supporting a
patient's right to refuse medical treatment for any reason, even if the
decision "is generally regarded as foolhardy," 43 it was also careful to
note on a number of occasions that, in this case, the refusal was based on
the patient's religious values as a Jehovah's Witness. 44 The court
characterized her refusal of transfusions as choosing to assure her
chances of eternal salvation in accordance with the tenets of her faith,
38 Ibia at 431.
3 9 Ibid. at 421.
40 Ibid. at 429-30.
41 Ibid. at 432.
4 2 Ibid at 430.
4 3 Ibid at 426 and at 424.
4 4 Ibid at 426 and at 428.
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rather than as choosing death 45  One is left wondering whether the
weight the court accorded the right to self-determination in Malette was
affected by its own ability to identify with the patient's reason for
refusing treatment-her religious values. As the trial judge noted in a
passage of his judgment that was quoted by the Ontario Court of
Appeal:
However sacred life may be ... certain aspects of life are properly held to be more
important than life itself. Such proud and honourable motivations are long entrenched in
society ... refusal of medical treatment on religious grounds is such a value. 46 [emphasis
added]
The situation was expressly distinguished from "suicide" or
"euthanasia, '47 words heavily freighted with unfavourable connotations
in both our legal system and in society more generally. The court went
on to state that:
The patient manifestly made the decision on the basis of her religious convictions. It is
not for the doctor to second-guess the reasonableness of the decision or to pass judgment
on the religious principles which motivated it.48 [emphasis added].
In the court's eyes, this patient had an acceptable motivation for refusing
treatment. The extent to which that became key rather than the
patient's unadorned right to determine what medical treatment she
would receive (even to the point of choosing an avoidable death) is
unclear. While the court did affirm that the state has a "strong interest"
in preserving life, which may in some circumstances override the
individual's right to self-determination, it left those circumstances largely
unspecified 4 9
From a pragmatic point of view, if the acceptability of the
patient's motive for refusing life-sustaining treatment has been
incorporated into this area of the law-that is, if treatment must be
refused for a "good" reason-this imposes a nearly impossible task on
medical personnel, particularly when working under the pressures
generated by an emergency. They must be able to recognize not only
that this patient's refusal of treatment can be relied upon, but also that it
45 bid. at 428 and at 432-33. While this is frequently the reasoning employed when Jehovah's
Witnesses refuse transfusions, the characterization of that choice is certainly not the only one it
could reasonably bear.
4 61bid, at 422.
4 7 Ibid. at 428.
48 bid. at 432.
49 Ibid. at 429.
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was made for a reason with respect to which a sufficient social consensus
currently exists to justify honouring it. One can understand a court
being hesitant to give patients carte blanche to refuse all medical
treatment in all circumstances. Still, this does not seem to be the way to
go about balancing respect for the patient's autonomy with the state's
legitimate interests in preserving life and respect for the sanctity of life
and in maintaining the integrity of the health professionsSO
The decisions in Malette and Niemiec provide an interesting
contrast in reasoning as well as in result. In Niemiec, the Quebec
Superior Court expressed little sympathy for the reason the person
concerned refused treatment, namely, that death was preferable to
returning to his own country. In Malette, both the trial and the appellate
courts seemed able to empathize strongly with and therefore respect the
plaintiff's reason: religious commitment. In the former case, the court
found the patient's refusal of treatment directly antithetical to the
principle of the inviolability of the person, which it interpreted as an
instrumental principle aimed at the protection and preservation of life.
In the latter, the court held that treating the patient in the face of her
refusal violated her rights of self-determination and bodily integrity,
thereby diminishing the value of her life.51 In Malette, the patient's life
and limits on the steps taken to preserve it were assessed against the
backdrop of her own value system-a value system the court and society
at large could accept. In Niemiec, the court assessed the person's
express wish to die rather than be returned to his own country against a
generalized value system that prizes continued life as an absolute good,
and found the patient's wishes less persuasive; the preservation of life
prevailed as the controlling value.
5 2
50 For a physician's viewpoint on difficulties with the level of uncertainty sanctioned by Malette
regarding an incompetent patient's prior wishes to forego life-sustaining treatment, see P.A. Singer
& F.H. Lowy, "Refusal of Life-sustaining Treatment, the Malette Case, and Decision-making
Under Uncertainty" (1991) 24 Annals R.C.P.S.C. 401. For comments on the difficulty of the task
facing judges "called to patients' bedsides and required to make life or death decisions," see In Re
A.C., 573 A.2d 1237 [hereinafter ReA.C.] at 1237, note 2 and at 1248 (D.C. App. 1990). The task
facing treating physicians is much more difficult, particularly in an emergency situation. They must
not only make such decisions but also attend to the patient at the same time. Post hoc evaluation of
health care providers' decisions as though they were made on the same basis and in the same time
frame as judicial decisions is unrealistic. Unlike judges, health care providers often do not have the
liberty to, or the luxury of, reserving their decisions.
51 Niemiec, supra note 28 at 427; Malette supra note 31 at 430.
52 It must also be recognized that Niemiec was decided while the crisis was on-going-the
person concerned might still have died-while Malette was decided after the fact, when the patient
had recovered, albeit with permanent injuries. The very different viewpoints, which foresight and
hindsight must have given the decisionmakers, cannot be discounted. In this regard, see In ReA.C.,
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One year after Malette, in another decision authored by Mr.
Justice Robins, the Ontario Court of Appeal again affirmed a patient's
right to refuse medical treatment. In Fleming v. Reid5 3 two involuntary
patients being held pursuant to Lieutenant Governor's warrants had,
while competent, refused treatment with neuroleptic drugs for their
schizophrenia. Each had made his refusal known to the Official
Guardian, whom each had appointed his substitute decision maker
should he later become incompetent, as provided in governing
legislation, the Mental Health Act.54 When the patients became
incompetent, their attending physician took the matter to a review board
seeking authorization to administer the drugs. The statute provided that
the review board had to make its determination only on the basis of the
patients' best interests, thus excluding a consideration of their earlier,
competent refusal of the drugs. The board authorized treatment and the
patients appealed, alleging a violation of their rights under section 7 of
the Charter.55
The court held that the statutory provisions depriving
involuntary patients of any right to have their prior competent decisions
about psychiatric treatment control or even be considered in a later
period of incompetence breached the patients' right to security of the
person under section 7 of the Charter.5 6 The breach could not be
justified under section 1 of the Charter and, hence, the impugned
statutory provisions could not stand. In an interesting development, the
court explicitly melded the patients' common law rights in consent-to-
treatment cases with the rights guaranteed under section 7 of the
Charter.
The common law right to bodily integrity and personal autonomy is so entrenched in the
traditions of our law as to be ranked as fundamental and deserving of the highest order of
protection. This right forms an essential part of an individual's security of the person and
must be included in the liberty interests protected by s. 7. Indeed, in my view the
common law right to determine what shall be done with one's own body and the
supra note 50 at 1237, note 2 and at 1248 (D.C. App. 1990) vacating a lower court's order that a
caesarian section be performed on a terminally ill woman-but after the fact. Both mother and
child had died shortly after the operation. The appellate court expressed reservations that judges
"called to patients' bedsides and called on to make quick decisions on matters of life and death"
could ever "realistically frame principled and useful responses to the legal dilemma with which they
are being confronted."
53 Supra note 20.
54 Supra note 20.
55 Supra note 19.
56 Fleming, supra note 20.
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constitutional right to security of the person, both of which are founded on the belief in
the dignity and autonomy of each individual, can be treated as co-extensive.
57
Thus, at least where the necessary element of government action is
present,58 a patient's common law right to refuse treatment is now
recognized as having the extra weight of constitutional status behind it as
well.
In Fleming, the patient's right to refuse medical treatment was, if
anything, stated even more strongly than in Malette:
With very limited exceptions, every person's body is considered inviolate, and,
accordingly, every competent adult has the right to be free from unwanted medical
treatment. The fact that serious risks or consequences may result from a refusal of
medical treatment does not vitiate the right of medical self-determination ... It is the
patient, not the doctor, who ultimately must decide if treatment-any treatment-is to be
administered. 59
Neither the court's affirmation of the patients' right to refuse treatment
nor its recognition of the force and effect of a patient's advance
instructions respecting his or her future care was tied to, or contingent
on, the patient having "good" reasons for the decision, as was arguably
the case in Malette.
At the same time, though, the court did set out in detail the
serious side effects potentially associated with the use of neuroleptic
drugs, emphasising the extremely intrusive nature of the treatment.
60
After reading the list of complications, one is left with the distinct
impression that a reasonable person might well choose to live with the
symptoms of the mental illness rather than to risk the side effects of the
drugs. There was no explicit link drawn in the judgment between the
court's support for the patients' right to refuse treatment and the
existence of rationally supportable, "good" reasons for the
refusal-reasons which the court and anyone else could find credible.
Nor was there any indication that these reasons must actually have
formed the basis of the patients' decisions. Indeed, the court said it did
not matter that the patient' decisions may seem "ill-advised." 61 Yet, if
patients really do have a near-absolute right to refuse medical treatment
regardless of motivation, one wonders why the description of the drugs'
dangers was included in the judgment at all; there was no similar
57Ibk at 88.
58 See cases cited supra note 20 (applicability of the Charter to medical treatment decisions).
59 Fleming, supra note 20 at 85.
60/bi at 84-85 and at 88.
61 Ibid at 86 and at 91.
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description of the serious effects of the illness on these patients.62 The
judgment in Fleming, then, does not entirely answer the questions
Malette raised respecting limits on the rights of competent patients to
refuse treatment.
Fleming involved the non-consensual administration of
psychiatric treatment. In that sense, it could be said to be
distinguishable from cases involving the withholding or withdrawal of life
support, as the refusal of treatment being considered was not life-
threatening. Yet a patient's right to make decisions regarding medical
treatment and the pre-eminent place accorded that right in legal analysis
should not differ just because the treatment proposed could be life-
saving. Indeed, the court in Fleming seems to have meant to speak more
at large:
The patient's right to forego treatment, in the absence of some overriding societal
interest ... must be honoured, even though the treatment may be beneficial or necessary
topreserve the patient's life or health. 63 [emphasis added]
There is good reason to hold to a paradigm of decision making
that affirms the competent patient's control in questions of life support.
The doctor-patient relationship is marked by a strong imbalance of
power, an imbalance that flows from disparities in knowledge and access
to resources, as well as from the physical, emotional, and psychological
toll taken by being ill and in need of medical assistance.64 Physicians
commonly and with the best of intentions seek to guide their patients
toward particular treatment decisions. 65 In doing so, they exert a very
strong influence. However, the solution a physician views as optimal
may be narrowly focused on relieving a particular set of symptoms,
regardless of side effects and regardless of inability to cure the
underlying diseases or disabling conditions. 66 It is the patient who
experiences the illness, its treatment, and its repercussions. In short, it is
62 For a contrasting, contemporaneous decision, see Institut Phillipe Pinel de Montrial v. Blais
(1991), RJ.Q. 1969 (Que. S.C.) authorizing treatment for an involuntary patient detained pursuant
to a Lieutenant Governor's warrant who refused all treatment. In her decision, Lebel J. detailed the
effects schizophrenia had on the patient, seemingly largely to establish that he had never been
competent to refuse treatment.
63 Supra note 20 at 86.
64 On the nature of the doctor-patient relationship, see Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226.
65 See Katz, supra note 22; and Dickens, supra note 22. Canadian courts, too, have recognized
physicians' influence on patients' choices of treatment. See, for example, Bucknam v. Kostick
(1983), 3 D.L.R (4th) 99 at 112 (Ont. H.C.); aff'd. (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 187 (CA.).
66 Life-Sustaining Technologies, supra note 1 at 25; Rhoden, supra note 7 at 428, note 227 and
at 430.
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the patient who has to live (or not) with the decision. As such, it is the
patient who should be the one to ultimately determine whether to
undergo treatment, even where the treatment would be life-sustaining.
Strong support from the legal system for a patient's right to self-
determination in this area will go some way toward compensating for the
powerful forces built into the very structure of our health care delivery
system that tend to take health care decisions away from the patient.
Increasingly, courts are providing that support.
Most recently, Nancy B., a competent young woman
permanently disabled by Guillain Barr6 syndrome, commenced
proceedings in the Quebec Superior Court seeking an injunction
requiring the hospital in which she was a patient, its staff, and her
physician to refrain from administering treatment without her consent
and to stop treatment in progress at her request.67 Specifically, she
wished to be removed from the ventilator which sustained her life, but
she was physically incapable of doing so herself. The suit was not
contested by either the defendant hospital or her physician, who had
been added to the proceedings as a third party. Both, however, were
concerned for their potential criminal liability if they acceded to the
patient's request. Hence, they required some form of judicial
imprimatur before they would act. All parties, including the intervener,
the Attorney General for Quebec, agreed that pursuant to Quebec's
Civil Code, no one could be made to undergo care without his or her
consent. 68 The Quebec Superior Court held that the respirator was a
form of medical treatment to which the Code applied, and that, having
initially consented to the treatment, the patient was entitled to request
that it be stopped.69
The court then turned to consider the effect of the Criminal
Code. While recognizing that if read technically and entirely in the
abstract some sections of the Code might be applicable to the actions of
one who removed Nancy B. from the ventilator,70 the court concluded
that the practical ramifications of such an interpretation were such that
it could not have been Parliament's intent. Any other result would be
"absurd." 71 Rather, the federal and provincial legislation ought to be
read together as a coherent whole. In that light, the behaviour of a
67Nancy B., supra note 10.
68 b 1W at 389-90.
69 IbU at 392.
70 See, for example, Crimina/Code, supra note 33, ss. 217,219,241.
71 Nancy B., supra note 10 at 393.
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physician who "interrupts the respiratory support of a patient, at the
patient's informed request, in order to let nature take its course" would
not attract criminal liability.7 2 In the result, the court made an order
permitting Nancy B.'s physician to stop respiratory support when the
patient so requested, and to ask the hospital for any necessary assistance
"so that everything takes place in a manner respecting the dignity of the
plaintiff."73 The order was not to take effect until the expiry of the
period within which an appeal could be commenced. Nancy B. remained
firm in her decision, was removed from the ventilator, and died shortly
thereafter.
A few weeks after this decision, in Manoir de la Pointe Bleue
(1978) Inc. v. Corbeil,74 Mr. Justice Rouleau of the Quebec Superior
Court granted the petition of a long-term care institution for a
declaration that it must neither administer treatment nor transfer a
patient elsewhere without consent when the patient had executed a legal
directive requesting that he be allowed to die by starvation. The patient
was a competent thirty-five-year-old man, married with two young
children, who had been permanently paralysed from the neck down
following an accident with an all-terrain vehicle in 1990. At the time of
72 Ibi& at 394.
73 Ibid. at 395. The permissive phrasing of the order is noteworthy. It raises questions as to
the result if physicians, hospital staff, or the hospital had been unwilling to assist. The extent to
which courts can or will require hospitals and medical personnel to implement non-treatment
decisions has been touched on by courts in other jurisdictions. In the United States, see Bouvia v.
Superior Cour 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 at 304 and at 306 (CaApp. 2 Dist. 1986) (a competent patient's
right to self-determination as to her own medical treatment-removal of nasogastric tube-must be
paramount to the interests of the hospital and doctors in continuing her care, nor may they deny her
relief from pain and suffering should she exercise that right); Bartling v. Superior Court of California,
163 Cal. App.3d 186 (Cal. C.A. 1984); and Battling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center, 184 Cal.
App.3d 961 (Cal. C.A. 1986). See also Re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434 [hereinafter Jobes] at 450 (NJ.S.C.
1987), and In re Requena, 517 A.2d 886 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1986) to the same effect. But see Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hospita4 497 N.E.2d 626 [hereinafter Brophy] at 639-40 (Mass. SJ.C., 1986)
(where substituted judgment of patient in a persistent vegetative state is to cease artificial feeding
and hydration, hospital could refuse to remove or clamp G-tube where hospital is willing to assist in
a transfer of the patient to a suitable facility or home and hospital asserts a breach of its ethical
integrity, as there is substantial disagreement in the medical community over the appropriate course
of action. Medical professionals in these circumstances are not to be compelled to take "active
measures contrary to their view of their ethical duty toward their patients.") In the United
Kingdom, see Re . (A Minor. Child in Care: Medical Treatment), [1992] 4 All E.R. 614 (CA.)
[hereinafter Re J ] (a court will not require a medical practitioner or health authority to adopt a
course of treatment that in the bona fide clinical judgment of the practitioner concerned is contra-
indicated as not being in the best interests of the patient-in that case, repeated ventilation and
other "intensive" measures to prolong the life of a severely handicapped infant with an unalterably
short life expectancy).
74 Supra note 10.
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writing this article, the patient had not asked that the directive be put
into effect. 75
Nancy B. and Corbeil strongly support a patient's right to self-
determination in medical treatment, even when the patient's decision
will result in an otherwise avoidable death and the assistance of a third
party will be required to effectuate the decision (to remove Nancy B.
from the ventilator or to ease any suffering Robert Corbeil might
experience). Both, however, were based on Quebec's Civil Code, which
provides as follows:
Art. 19. The human person is inviolable. No one may cause harm to the person of
another without his consent or without being authorized by law to do so.
Art. 19.L No person may be made to undergo care of any nature, whether for
examination, specimen taking, removal of tissue, treatment or any other act,
except with his consent.
Where the person concerned is unable to consent to or refuse care, a person authorized
by law or by mandate shall replace him.76
Despite their basis in civil law, these decisions nonetheless should not be
considered to be limited in effect only to Quebec. The Civil Code's
statement of the inviolability of the individual and the need to obtain his
or her consent to treatment and care are essentially identical to the right
to autonomy and bodily integrity and the requirement of obtaining the
patient's informed consent to medical treatment recognized at common
law.77 Consequently, Nancy B.'s and Corbeil's affirmation of the
patient's right to determine the medical treatment he or she will receive
is as applicable in the rest of Canada as it is in Quebec.
Given that the Quebec Superior Court recognized a competent
patient's right to refuse consent to even life-saving treatment in Nancy B.
and Corbeil, one must ask whether its earlier decision in Niemiec 78 has
now been effectively overruled. After all, that was the very right
Niemiec asserted when he refused treatment for the wire he had
swallowed and opposed the hospital's application for judicial
authorization to treat and force-feed him. Indeed, Rouleau, J. suggested
in Corbeil that Article 19.1 of the Civil Code, which came into force 15
75 (1992) 8 Humane Med. 303.
76 Arts. 19, 19.1 C.C.Q. Article 19.1 came into effect in 1990. See Corbeil, supra note 10.
77 See, for example, Fleming, supra note 20 at 88. Indeed, Nancy B. was cited with approval by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Rodrigue; supra note 10 (a British Columbia case).
78 Supra note 28.
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April 1990, would be dispositive of a like case today.79 The cases are
distinguishable, however. The operative forces in Nancy B. were much
more like those in Malette80 than Niemiec. As in Malette, the court in
Nancy B. was clearly able to empathize with the patient and her
plight-in Dufour, J.'s words, Nancy B. was "literally tied to her hospital
bed," with no hope of cure or even any improvement in her condition.81
As her mother testified, for her daughter, "[i]t's no longer liveable."8 2 In
those circumstances, the court was prepared to accept both the patient's
assessment of her life83 and her choice.
The same is true of the decision in Corbeil. Once again, the
court was careful to ascertain that, for this patient, the circumstances of
his life were insupportable.8 4 Although noting that no one can judge
another's quality of life, Robert Corbeil's situation and choice obviously
engaged the court's sympathy. Rouleau, J. cited with approval an earlier
decision of the Quebec Superior Court, Re Goyette:
L'6tat doit preserver la vie humaine, mais s, malgr ces soins, la vie devient inhwnaine,
cest la dignit6 de la personne qui doit l'emporter sur l'interet do l'6tat. L'art. 12 do la
charte canadienne des droits permet alors hL la personne de dire que tout traitement
qu'on veut lui administrer est 'cruel' et elle peut le refuser. Mais lk test de la disparition de
la digniti de vie doit &m objectif. 85[emphasis added]
He added that:
[l]e cas Robert Corbeil est sfirement aussi grave. Dans ces circonstances, la d6cision A
prendre doit aller dans le sens de la primaut6 du respect de ]a volont6 do l'intim6 do
mettre fin A ses jours. 86[emphasis added]
Whether the patient's choice of an avoidable death is to be accepted at
face value in all circumstances remains an unanswered question. Given
the state's interest in the protection and preservation of life, will a court
79 Corbeil, supra note 10. However, Dufour, J. in Nancy B., supra note 10 at 389, pointed out
that the legal duty to obtain consent to treatment existed in Quebec prior to the addition of s. 19.1
to the Code. See also Couture-Jacquet v. Montreal Children's Hospital (1986), 28 (D.L.R.) (4th) 22
(Que. CA.) [hereinafter Couture-$acquet] at 31, Chevalier J.
80 Supra note 29.
81 Nancy B.,supra note 10 at 387.
82 1bid. at 388.
83 Although this remains unspoken, it is implicit in the judgment.
8 4 Corbeil, supra note 10.
85 bid at 719, citing Re Goyette Centre de Senices Soclaux du MontrEal, [1983] C.S. 429 at 436
[hereinafter Goyette].
86 Corbei ibid
[voL. 31 NO. 3
Withholding Life Support
always abide by the patient's evaluation or, as Goyette suggested, will the
decision be subject to a preliminary test of the disappearance of human
dignity, objectively determined, that is, evaluated from an outside
standpoint? Corbeil did not require the court to answer this question,
for, as Rouleau J. noted, he was proceeding on the basis that it could
reasonably be concluded that Robert Corbeil's life had passed that
pointi 7
These cases, then, do not test the limits of a patient's right to
make decisions about medical treatment when the course chosen will
result in an avoidable death. Niemiec presented just such a challenge in
refusing treatment for harm he had done to himself. Unlike Nancy B.
and Robert Corbeil, his lifespan would not otherwise be curtailed in
duration or quality if he were treated (at least in the court's assessment,
if not his own). The court in Nancy B., just as in Malette, was careful to
distinguish this patient's decision to decline life-sustaining medical
treatment from an attempt to commit suicide; death for Nancy B. would
be "the result, primarily, of the underlying disease, and not the result of
a self-inflicted injury."88 By way of contrast, Niemiec's refusal of
treatment was characterized as a wish for self-destruction. The court
concluded that allowing him to assert the inviolability of his person in
these circumstances would subvert the legislative purpose underlying
that principle.8 9 Based on that view of Niemiec's decision, it would also
arguably fall outside the protection afforded by the freedom of
conscience and religion guaranteed by the Charter9o even if that term is
read broadly to include a secular, conscientious morality.9 1 The Court in
Niemiec would not have been prepared to accept his choice as either
conscientious or expressive of a particular morality.
The suggestion remains after Malette, Fleming, Nancy B., and
Corbeil that a patient's right to self-determination is subject to greater
restriction than would at first seem apparent from a reading of these
judgments. Choices to refuse life-sustaining treatment may be
scrutinized with a view to assessing the degree of congruence with
generally acceptable motivations and values. This limitation is not
871bid.
88 Nancy B., supra note 10 at 393, quoting with approval from an American decision, Re
Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (NJ.S.C. 1985) [hereinafter Conroy]; see also Ma/ette, supra note 31 at 428.
8 9Niemiec, supra note 28 at 427.
9 0 Supra note 19, s. 2 (a).
91 See Wilson J. (concurring) in Morgentaler v. R., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 [hereinafter Morgentaler]
at 178-79 on the breadth of s. 2(a) of the Charter.
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express, but arises by implication from the careful factual basis laid in
each of these judgments. Motives are, of course, open to differing
interpretations. One can see that the manner in which a court
characterizes the patient's reasons for refusing treatment-the
generosity of its reading-could become very significant. For instance, if
the court in Niemiec had been prepared to see the refusal of treatment
as an act of political protest, perhaps the result would have been
different. Religious freedom (Malette), preservation of one's bodily and
mental integrity (Fleming), and relief from a permanent state of almost
complete physical immobility and dependence on others (Nancy B. and
Corbeil) have all proven to be examples of acceptable motivations,
although they by no means constitute an exhaustive list. The parameters
of any limitations on patients' right to refuse life-sustaining treatment
remain to be mapped more clearly.
One obvious limitation is to be taken from sections 14 and 241 of
the Criminal Code (which vitiate the effect of consent to one's own death
and prohibit assisting in suicide, respectively 92) and the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney-
General) affirming that while Sue Rodriguez, who suffered from
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, had the right to refuse even life-sustaining
treatment, she did not have a right at common law or under the Charter
to assistance in bringing about her own death.93 The Court maintained
the distinction between refusing treatment, which is permissible and can
be effectuated even where the result will be death, and assisting in taking
a life, which is not. The interest of the state in preserving life and
protecting the vulnerable outweighs the individual interest in autonomy
in the latter but not the former. At first glance, the difference between
92 Criminal Code, supra note 33.
93 Supra note 10. The decision was made by the narrowest of margins-five judges in the
majority and four dissenting. The dissenting judges were variously of the view that the impugned
section of the Criminal Code violated the applicant's right to liberty or security of the person under
s. 7 of the Charter or that the law breached her equality rights under s. 15 of the Charter,
discriminating against her on the basis of physical disability. The dissenting judges would have
recognized that Sue Rodriguez had not only a right to take her own life but also a right to
"assistance under proper circumstances." Ibi at 566. These would include testing for decisional
capacity, time-limited certification by a physician with respect to the applicant's condition, state of
mind, and a number of other matters, advance notice to the coroner, and the presence of a
physician, although the act taking her life would have to be her own-in other words, "unassisted."
Ibi. For a suggestion from another discipline that where an individual wants to end his own life,
the "humane response is a presumption that he or she is suffering from a treatable mental illness
(Le with impaired judgment) until proven otherwise (reversing the normal presumption of
competence)," see F. Lowy, a psychiatrist and Director of the Centre for Bioethics at the University
of Toronto, "What Kind of Life? What Kind of Death? The Sue Rodriguez Case" Canadian Bar
Association-Ontario and Medical-Legal Society of Toronto, Tape S-92-707 (14 May 1993).
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the two situations seems apparent and the distinction a salutary one to
maintain-the right to self-determination has to do with making
decisions about one's own health care, not having oneself killed. Society
does not condone killing; the extent of societal disapprobation of killing
is such that it is appropriately expressed through criminal sanctions.
That argument is convincing in the abstract. However, the difference
between what will constitute assisting a patient to refuse treatment and
assisting that patient to die is not so obvious in practice. In Nancy B., for
instance, the actions of third persons removing the patient from the
ventilator were characterized as the former.94 They could equally well
have been characterized as the latter, since the result that would follow
(and indeed, was intended) was obvious to all, and that result was
deathY5 Nonetheless, whether always logically defensible or not, the
difference in the legal consequences of the two is clear.
To summarize, where the patient is competent, courts appear
increasingly willing to give effect to the familiar proposition that
common law medical treatment cases cite and recite: every human being
of adult years and sound mind has the right to determine what shall be
done with his or her own body. This principle is not applied in every
instance, nor without ambivalence. The strength of courts' commitment
to the underlying values-which they most often identify as autonomy,
self-determination and bodily integrity-wavers, particularly if the court
has difficulty accepting the reason for refusing treatment. Other
principles and interests compete, and sometimes prevail. But for the
most part, where the patient. is competent, the theme of self-
determination predominates. 96  And so it should, given the
countervailing forces in our health care system and in the dynamics of
physician-patient relationships, and even more importantly, given that it
is the patient who has to live with and through decisions about whether
to undergo treatment.
94 Supra note 10 at 392.
95 SeeJ. Fletcher, "The Courts and Euthanasia" (1987188) 15 Law, Med. & Health Care 223
at 224-25.
96 This seems true where there is no judicial intervention as well. For example, in Alberta
recently, a woman left paralysed and in intractable pain after being shot requested the removal of a
life-sustaining respirator and the hospital complied. She died shortly thereafter. "Shot by Spouse,
Woman Asks to Die" The Globe & Mail (3 August 1991) A2. Other hospitals and health care
workers are not so sanguine about their own potential liability in such a situation. See Nancy B. and
Corbeil, supra note 10.
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III. DEFINITIONS OF DEATH: WHEN IS THERE A DECISION
TO BE MADE?
One might expect there to be general agreement on the minimal
point beyond which life support need not be continued, that being when
death has occurred. Yet in Canada, it is not absolutely clear that the
legal and medical definitions of death coincide,97 thus complicating the
consideration of when there is any decision to be made about suspending
the use of life support or about the identity of appropriate decision-
makers. Whatever the definition of death, determining that it has
occurred is still a medical judgment and consequently, remains in the
hands of physicians. 98 After the fact, however, the law may have
something different to say about when death occurred and may even
recognize several different times of death.99 The traditional legal
definition of death considers it to be an event occurring at an identifiable
point in time, generally when heartbeat and respiration cease. Most
physicians, however, now believe that it is more accurate to view death
as a process, or alternatively, that death may manifest itself in various
ways and is certainly not limited to a situation where the heart has
stopped functioning. In medicine, then, brain death has assumed greater
importance in determining when life has ceased.
A number of organizations, particularly in the United States,
have developed criteria for establishing when brain death has
9 7 L. Kushnir, "Bridging the Gap: The Discrepancy Between Medical and Legal Definitions of
Death" (1976) 34 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 199. See also B. Dickens, "Legal Evolution of the Concept of
Brain Death" (1985) 2 Transplantation Today 60.
98 But see M. Burgess, "Law and Ethics: Opportunistic Infections of Medical Practice?"
(1988) 3 Can. J. L. S. 265 and 269, pointing out that definitions of death have moral, cultural, and
religious, as well as medical aspects. Currently, we have given this determination entirely over to
physicians. Burgess suggests that widespread adoption of the "brain death criterion" once
transplants became feasible represents one more example of the medical profession successfully
pressuring society to accept expedient technical solutions without resolving underlying moral,
cultural, and religious differences. Robert Veatch concludes that "[p]lacing responsibility on the
individual physician or the profession as a whole for deciding what the definition of death should be
is the result of inadequate analysis." While physicians have special skills to determine whether
particular bodily functions have ceased, they have no particular expertise to select a particular
philosophical or theological concept of death. See R. Veatch, Death, Dying and the Biological
Revolution: The Last Quest forResponsibility, rev'd. ed. (New York: Yale U. Press, 1989) at 48.
99 As one commentator noted regarding the laws governing transplantation in the early 1980s,
"tihe legislatures of the English-speaking provinces have embarked upon a path of balkanization of
the human body," as "the definition of death ... varies depending upon which particular organ is to
be transplanted." B. Freedman, "'By Good Appliance Recovered': New Reflections on Organ
Transplantation and the Definition of Death in Canada" (1982) 3 Health L. Can. 3.
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occurred. 100 The Canadian Medical Association has clearly accepted the
concept of brain death as an ethically valid basis for defining death.101
The Law Reform Commission of Canada has recommended that
legislation be passed recognizing that "a person is dead when an
irreversible cessation of all that person's brain functions has
occurred." 10 2 At present, however, Manitoba is the only province to
expressly recognize brain death as an acceptable criterion for the
determination of death.103 Even legislation the various provinces have
developed to deal with organ transplants sidesteps the issue by omitting
to ascribe a meaning to the concept of death or to indicate how to
determine whether it has occurred. In Ontario, for instance, section 7 of
the Human Tissue Gift Act provides: "For the purposes of a post mortem
transplant, the fact of death shall be determined by at least two
physicians in accordance with accepted medical practice." 104
Canadian case law gives little guidance as to whether brain death
can be equated with death, particularly as most of the cases concerned
with determining when death occurred have arisen in the very different
context of establishing entitlement to insurance proceeds or bequests
under a will.OS One of the very few Canadian judgments to consider this
issue is the dissenting opinion in R. v. Kitching and Adams, 106 a 1976
decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal. The defendants, who had
1 0 0 The first and most prominent of these American definitions was the "Report of the Ad
Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death" (1968)
205 1 Am. Med. Assoc. 85.
101 Canadian Medical Association, "A C.MA. Position-Guidelines for the Definition of
Brain Death" (1987) 136 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 200 A-B.
102 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Criteria for the Determination of Death (Report No.
15) (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1981) at 25. The determination would be made on the
basis of prolonged absence of spontaneous circulatory and respiratory functions, or, when this is
impossible because of the use of artificial means of support, by any means recognized by the
ordinary standards of current medical practice.
103 Vital Statistics Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. V-60, s. 2 provides: "For all purposes within the
legislative competence of the Legislature of Manitoba, the death of a person takes place at the time
at which irreversible cessation of all that person's brain functions occurs."
104 Human Tissue GiftAc R.S.O. 1990, c. H.20, s. 7. Other provincial legislation regulating
organ transplants contains similar provisions. See, for example, Human TissueAc R.S. N. 1990, c.
H.15, s. 9(1); Human Tissue Ac4 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 187, s. 7; Human T7ssue Gift Ac4 R.S.N.S. 1989,
c.215, s. 8; Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.P.E.L 1988 c. H-13, s. 7(1); Human Tissue GiftAc R.S.A.
1980, c.H-12, s. 7; Human Tissue Gift Ac R.S.S. 1978, c.H-15, s. 8(1); Human Tissue Gift Act
R.S.Y.T. 1986, c. 89, s. 7.
105 See, for example, Re Warwicker v. Toronto General Trust Corp. (1936), 3 D.L.R. 368 (Ont.
S.C.).
106[1976] 6 W.W.R. 697.
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caused the deceased's original head injuries, asserted that the real cause
of death was the acts of the physicians in removing the deceased's
kidneys for transplant purposes and, thereafter, in stopping the
respirator. The Crown responded that the deceased was already dead by
that time, as brain death had been established. Upon canvassing the
various criteria proposed for establishing the occurrence of brain death,
the dissenting judge held the view that there was not a broad enough
consensus among physicians to be able to determine when brain death
had occurred, but that the issue was not essential to the resolution of the
case.107 His comments in this regard were not adopted by the majority,
who simply noted that the deceased was maintained on a respirator to
preserve his organs, not his life, but did not consider the defendant's
argument in detail.108
In a more recent decision of the British Columbia Supreme
Court, R. v. Green,1 9 Mr. Justice Wood also relied on the traditional
definition of death-that is, death does not occur until the cessation of
all vital functions, including the heart. In that case, it was necessary to
determine whether the accused (who admitted shooting the deceased
after the deceased had already been shot by someone else) could be
found guilty of murder. Each shot taken individually would have been
fatal, in that the damage to the respiratory centre of the brain was so
significant that respiration would have ceased. However, the evidence
also showed that the heart would continue beating for three to five
minutes after the first shot, during which time the accused also shot the
deceased. The court had to determine at what point death
occurred-with the extensive brain damage caused by the first shot, or
some minutes later, after the victim had been shot by the accused and his
heart stopped beating. The court ultimately concluded that while brain
death may be a suitable legal standard in medical and civil law contexts,
it was impractical to apply in criminal law. In reaching this conclusion,
the court seemed largely motivated by what it regarded as the impossible
burden this would place on the Crown to prove when death had
occurred. This would itself seem to be a misreading of the medical
understanding of death. Brain death is only one of the clinical criteria
physicians commonly employ to determine whether death has occurred;
it does not necessarily exclude other clinical criteria. Either brain
criteria or heart and lung criteria can, as appropriate, be taken as
10 7Tbid at 711-14, O'Sullivan J.A.
108 Ibid at 701, Matas J.A.
109 (1988), 43 C.C.C. (3d) 413 (B.C.S.C.).
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indicators of death, in the sense of irreversible destruction of whole
brain function.
Current medical knowledge and, indeed, unchallenged medical
practice so overwhelmingly support the conclusion that brain death can
be equated with death that Canadian courts can be expected to
acknowledge this to be so, certainly in the context of decisions about life
support. Such a result would be consistent with the direction taken by
courts in the United Kingdom and the United States.110 This conclusion
finds support in the provinces' willingness to afford legal recognition to
"accepted medical practice" in determining when death has occurred
evidenced by the legislation governing transplants.111 Although criminal
liability is determined by federal law, not provincial legislation, it is
almost impossible to imagine that a physician would be prosecuted
criminally for acts or omissions that are legal provincially. While the risk
of this occurring remains a theoretical possibility, the weight of legal and
medical authority leads to no other sensible conclusion than that brain
dead patients need not be maintained on life support mechanisms, and
that no liability would attach as a result of a physician suspending life
support from a patient determined to be brain dead in accordance with
currently accepted medical practice.
Beyond that, however, physicians, families, hospital ethics
committees, and courts are faced with quandaries arising from the
110 In the United Kingdom, this issue would appear to be resolved such that, at least in the
context of criminal proceedings, courts are prepared to acknowledge that where the victim of a
crime is considered dead by accepted medical criteria (i.e., brain death has occurred), life support
can be withdrawn without breaking the chain of causation between the original injury necessitating
the use of life support and the death. See Finlayson v. H.M. Advocate (1978), Solic. Law Times,
Notes 60 and R v. Maldherek R. v. Stee [1981] 2 All E.R. 422 (C.A.).
In Malcherek, Lord Lane, CJ., specifically noted at 429 that:
[w]hatever the strict logic of the matter may be, it is perhaps somewhat bizarre to suggest
... that where a doctor tries his conscientious best to save the life of a patient brought to
hospital in extremis, skilfully using sophisticated methods, drugs and machinery to do so,
but fails in his attempt and therefore discontinues treatment, he can be said to have
caused the death of the patient.
Although the court made it clear it was not passing judgment on whether the confirmatory
tests for brain death represented a satisfactory code of practice, implicit in Lord Lane's statement
must be a recognition and acknowledgment that "death" can be defined as brain death determined
in accordance with accepted medical practice. It is not that the state absents itself from any role in
defining death, but rather, that the state has limited its intervention to deciding that some other
profession shall decide, by leaving what the court chooses to characterize as a clinical decision in the
hands of clinicians.
111 Supra note 99.
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increasingly multiple meanings of death,112 and with difficult questions
about the extent to which contentious expansions of our understanding
of when death has occurred ought to be applied in decisions about life
support. The Law Reform Commission of Canada recommended that
the law should clearly state that a physician acts legally in deciding to
terminate or not to initiate "treatment which is useless or which no
longer offers reasonable hope, unless the patient has expressed his
wishes to the contrary."'1 3 One must ask, "reasonable hope" of what?
This question remains as an unexplored sub-text to the preceding
discussion. It does require attention both in the context of defining
death and more generally in decision making about life support. What
minimum must a patient meet before there is a point to determining his
or her best interests or what the patient's decision regarding the use of
112 See S. Goldberg, "The Changing Face of Death: Computers, Consciousness and Nancy
Cruzan" (1990) 43 Stan. LR. 659 at 665-81 (tracing the move from a whole brain definition of death
to the development in the United States of a legal and medical "consensus" that those who are
"permanently deprived of self-awareness by cessation of higher brain functioning" can be allowed to
die, and noting that some ethicists now distinguish the capacity for social interaction rather than
mere consciousness as crucial in determining whether life support need be continued). See also
Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (S.CA.D. 1987) [hereinafter Dello]
(accepting concept of neocortical or "higher brain" death). In a New Zealand decision, Auckland
Area Health Board v. Attorney-Genera4 [1993] 1 N.Z.L.R. 235 [hereinafter Auckland Area Health
Board] at 245 (H.C.), an application by a patient's doctors and hospital seeking court approval for
the removal of a ventilator from a man suffering from an extreme form of Guillain Barr6 syndrome
who was unable to communicate in anyway, Thomas J. commented on:
[t]he problem ... when life passes into death but obscurely ... the process of living can
become the process of dying. This is the plight of the irreversibly doomed patient.
Maintained by mechanical means they exist suspended in a state of moribund
inanimation. Whether a body devoid of a mind or, as in the case of Mr. L. a brain
destitute of a body, does not matter in any sensible way. In their chronic and persistent
vegetative condition they lack self-awareness or awareness of the surroundings in any
cognitive sense. They are the 'living dead'.
He did not mean by that expression that he considered the patient dead in the legal sense, but that
his decision turned on his conclusion that the ventilator was being used to defer death rather than
sustain life because the difference between brain death and this patients' state is "a matter of
medical description." Ibid. at 246. Distinguishing between treatment that sustains life and that
which defers death is likely to be a difficult if not impossible line to draw in many instances. In
Canada, an Alberta Provincial Court judge committed foster parents to stand trial on charges of
second degree murder with respect to their foster child who was in a permanent coma and arguably
showed no evidence of higher brain activity. The child had not suffered whole brain death. The
Crown ultimately chose to proceed to trial only on a charge of aggravated assault. See Lawyers
Weekly (14 January 1992) 14; The National (February 1992) 3; telephone conversation with D.
Abbey, counsel to the accused (6 July 1992). The decision would appear to be an isolated departure
from the general requirement of whole brain death in the criminal law context.
113 Supra note 32 at 55-56. See also British Columbia Royal Commission on Health Care and




life support would have been? Is it physical existence alone, or some
level of cognitive, sapient life114 or an appreciation or awareness of one's
environment and ability to interact?115 While it is beyond the scope of
this article to consider the question in detail, it is suggested that as a
practical matter, Canadian courts will not go beyond very accepted, very
conventional medical opinion in defining death in the context of life
support issues. In Canada currently, that would mean death would be
equated with whole brain death.1 16 Life support could be withdrawn
without question then. As we have seen, however, much more
problematic determinations must be made when the patient does not
meet that definition of brain death but is nonetheless in a severely
compromised position, for instance, in a persistent vegetative state or
barely conscious. Given that we can expect courts to take a very cautious
approach overall in this area, it follows that their analysis of when death
has occurred will be conservative as well. Certainly at this point, where
the patient evidences some brain activity a court confronted with the
question of whether or not to sanction the withholding or withdrawal of
life support will not begin by adopting an expansive definition of death.
In those circumstances, the question will be whether or not the patient
should be maintained with life support staving off the underlying disease
or condition, not whether the patient's existence as a person has ended,
although he or she still exists as a human being, as some writers have
suggested 17
114 This factor was emphasized in Re C, [1989] 2 All E.R. 783 at 787 (C.A.), but as a means of
judging quality or experience of life for this patient, not in terms of whether the patient did not exist
as a human being. In Auckland Area Health Board,supra note 112, the court relied on the patient's
lack of self-awareness and awareness of his surroundings "in any cognitive sense" to support its
conclusion that he was one of the "living dead" for whom life support only deferred death but could
not be regarded as sustaining life.
115 A criterion suggested by Goldberg, supra note 112; Rhoden, supra note 7 at 399-401 and at
442; A. Buchanan & D. Brock, Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision-Making
(Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1989) at 194-99.
116 The Law Reform Commission of Canada's recent report, Procurement and Transfer of
Human Tissues and Organs (Working Paper 66) (Hull, Que.: Supply and Services Canada, 1992) at
95-102 implicitly confirms this conclusion in its recommendation that death not be re-defined such
that anencephalic newborns (who are born missing a major portion of the brain, skull, and scalp and
who cannot survive) be deemed brain dead to enable early organ transplants.
117 See, for example, Buchanan & Brock, supra note 115 at 127-32.
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IV. DECISION MAKING FOR INCOMPETENT PATIENTS
There is a growing commitment to honouring a competent
patient's refusal of medical treatment, even when that treatment would
be life-saving or life-prolonging, on the basis that the patient's
autonomy-the right to determine for oneself what shall be done with
one's body-is paramount. However, the principles to be applied in
decision making when the patient is incompetent are much less clear.
This is particularly so where the incompetent patient is in a persistent
vegetative state or barely conscious but is not facing imminent death as
long as life-support is continued. Because of the indications in Malette
and Fleming, that patients' instructions about future care should prevail
or at least be given great weight in treatment decisions,118 the situation
of patients with advance directives will be analyzed separately from
those without.
A. Patients With Advance Directives
1. Introduction
Legislation providing for advance directives attempts to structure
an opportunity for competent individuals to exercise their right of self-
determination with respect to future medical treatment decisions that
must be made after the onset of incompetence. Subject to differing
conditions and limitations, a person while competent can make a living
will leaving instructions refusing or choosing life-support or other
specified therapies, or can execute a durable power of attorney for
health care appointing someone to make such decisions on his or her
behalf should the individual later become incompetent, or some
combination of the two. Nova Scotia recently formalized the effect to be
given to a patient's prior competent appointment of a substitute
decisionmaker in medical matters.1 19 Quebec has made provision for
appointment of a health care attorney as well.120 Manitoba legislation
now enables a patient to leave instructions with respect to treatment
118 Supra note 31 at 431 and Fleming supra note 20 at 85-86.
119 Consent to Medical Treatment and ConsequentialAmmendmentsAc4 supra note 12.
120 Quebec Civil Code, Art. 19.1 (enacted Bill 125, 1990).
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after the onset of incompetence.12 1 More wide-ranging legislation has
been passed in Ontario, although at the time of writing, it has not yet
been proclaimed in force. 22 Legislation in this area was recently
introduced in British Columbia and is expected shortly in Alberta.1 23
Advance directives have been sanctioned in many American states for
some time. In a move that began in California in 1976, most states have
passed legislation recognizing advance directives, such that there are
now many variations on natural death acts, durable powers of attorney
for health care, and family consent laws. The latter empower specified
others to decide health care matters even absent an advance directive.124
Federal legislatioi in the United States that became effective in 1992
contains explicit provisions to ensure that Medicare providers encourage
and honour advance directives by requiring them to be routinely offered
to patients, although prohibiting the facility from providing medical care
conditional on the existence of an advance directive having been
made.125
2. Difficulties in practice
Even where legislation is in place, however, practical and legal
difficulties remain. The first and most obvious is that relatively few
people execute living wills or durable powers of attorney, even in
jurisdictions where they have had statutory recognition for some time. 26
Secondly, the legislation is generally drafted in such a way that the
advance directive only becomes operative in quite restricted
situations-most often, not until the patient is suffering from a terminal
illness or death is otherwise imminent. This excludes whole categories of
121 See Health Care DirectivesAc supra note 12.
122 See Substitute DeciyionsAc4 Advocacy Ac and Consent to TreatmentAc supra note 12.
123 In British Columbia, see Bill 51, Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Ac
2d Sess., 35th Pal., British Columbia, 1993; Bill 49, Adult Guardianship Ac 2d Sess., 35th ParL,
British Columbia, 1993; and Bill 48, Representation Agreement Ac 2d Sess., 35th Parl., British
Columbia, 1993.
124 See J. Areen, "Advance Directives Under State Law and Judicial Decisions" (1991) 19
Law, Med. & Health Care 91 at 93-97, summarizing relevant state laws as at October 1990. See also
G. .Alexander, "Time for a New Law on Health Care Advance Directives" (1991) 42 Hastings L J.
755.
1 2 5 Alexander, ibid. at 770-71, citing Pub. L No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
126 In the United States, it is estimated that only 15 per cent of the population have done so.
See Areen, supra note 124 at 92.
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conditions for which people might wish to specify that treatment be
withheld-for instance, the onset of a persistent vegetative state, or a
curable disease where the patient is suffering from an underlying,
incurable malady or irremediable degeneration.127 Such provisions also
leave the physician in the position of gatekeeper, since classifying an
illness as "terminal" or death as "imminent" is very much a medical
judgment, and one that is frequently not made, at least not explicitly, or
not communicated.128 It is also difficult to have sufficient prescience to
anticipate the variety of conditions from which one might suffer, the
modalities of treatment that might be available and the range of
prognoses that might hold in order to draft a living will or guidelines for
a substitute decisionmaker in terms sufficiently clear and precise as to be
meaningful or binding.129
Finally, the existence of legislation authorizing advance
directives can itself be a two-edged sword, even though its aim is
generally to make it easier for people to refuse treatment. The decision
of the Supreme Court of Missouri in Cruzan is instructive in this
regard. 30 There, the state had passed living will legislation, which the
court held embodied a state policy strongly favouring life. Predictably
enough, Nancy Cruzan, a young woman in her mid-twenties, had not
made a living will. She was left in a persistent vegetative state following
an automobile accident. After a number of years, her parents sought
court approval for the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration.
In a decision affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court, it
was held that, absent compliance with the formalities required under the
statute, "no person can assume that choice [to have life support
12 7 See Evans v. Bellevue Hospital (28 July 1987) [unpublished], referred to in N.Y.L.J. (28
July 1987) 11 [hereinafter Evans].
128 See Life-Sustaining Technologies, supra note 1 at 7, noting that most dying patients have
never been declared terminally ill.
129 See, for example, Evans, supra note 127. An incompetent patient with AIDS Related
Complex had when still competent executed a document stating that life-sustaining treatment
should be withheld if his condition became such that he had no reasonable expectation of recovery
or regaining a meaningful quality of life. He had also executed a power of attorney for health care.
The patient developed toxoplasmosis, an infection resulting in brain lesions. The patient's health
care decisionmaker asked that antibiotic treatment be withheld. The patient's physicians refused, as
they were of the view that treatment could cure the infection and restore the patient's ability to
communicate. The court to which the dispute was referred authorized treatment on the ground that
the document's reference to "meaningful quality of life" was too ambiguous to sanction non-
treatment and that, while the patient had no hope of recovery from AIDS, he could recover from
toxoplasmosis, if treated.
130 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo.banc 1988) [hereinafter Cruzan (Mo. S.C.)] at 419-
20, affd., Cruzan, supra note 6.
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withdrawn] for an incompetent."131 On that basis, the court concluded it
was justified in imposing a very high standard of proof of the patient's
own choice regarding the use of life support on those seeking to have it
withdrawn.132 Seemingly, then, having life support withdrawn can be
even more difficult where a formal regime for advance directives has
been established than where there is no such legislation. In Cruzan, the
fact that a statutory system existed acted as a dead hand on the decision-
making process.1 33
3. Difficulties in analysis-the advance directive as a
competent/incompetent hybrid
Entirely apart from their practical shortcomings, advance
directives raise more profound ethical questions as well. It is difficult to
know whether to analyze them in relation to competent or incompetent
patients, for although advance directives only become operative after the
patient has become incompetent, they are an expression of the patient's
instructions made at an earlier time, while competent. Laws regarding
advance directives do not treat the onset of incompetence as a change of
any moment except for the limited purpose of triggering the advance
directive. Yet the loss of decisional capacity that is a necessary pre-
requisite to the advance directive becoming operative is itself obviously a
change with significant consequences. It is that assumption in the law
that the individual is and remains "all of a piece" regardless of the
intervening change in decisional capacity that has been challenged by
some philosophers and bio-medical ethicists. They criticize the lack of
clarity among supporters of advance directives as to whose instructions
are being honoured and whose interests are being served: is it the
131 Ibid. at 425 and quoted in Cruzan, supra note 6 at 2846.
132 For comments on the standard of proof courts impose in this type of case, see Rhoden,
supra note 7, and G. Annas, "When Procedures Limit Rights: From Quinlan to Conroy" (1985)
Hastings Center Report 24. Interestingly, after the United States Supreme Court released its
decision in Cruzan, the patient's parents returned to the Probate Court, asking it to consider new
evidence. The state Attorney General withdrew from the case, claiming the state had no further
role once its law had been clarified. The judge ruled that the new evidence now met the state's
evidentiary standard and gave permission for the discontinuance of artificial feeding. Nancy Cruzan
died 12 days later. See Martyn & Bourguignon, supra note 6 at 819, and note 8.
133 But see In Re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 at 952 and note 3 (Me. SJ.C. 1987), where the court
held that state living will legislation, which prohibited the inclusion of instructions to discontinue
artificial nutrition and hydration in an advance directive, did not affect the patient's common law
right to refuse medical treatment, exercisable through a competent intermediary. On the basis of
that right, the court held that the incompetent patient's artificial feeding could be withdrawn.
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present interests of the incompetent individual, or the past interests and
choices of the competent individual?
Briefly, those who criticize unquestioning reliance on advance
directives argue that the very process that activates the advance
directive-the onset of incompetence-can and often does bring with it
such a significant break in the patient's psychological continuity or in the
conditions of the patient's physical existence or both, that the advance
directive ought no longer apply.. It is said that the advance directive is
overtaken by events and, as a result, loses its moral authority as a basis
on which to make treatment decisions.13 4 This position is generally
based on one or both of the following arguments. The more obvious
claim is that what a person regarded as desirable or essential while
competent or healthy may change drastically in ways that cannot be
foreseen when the person becomes incompetent or seriously ill. Matters
that were of deep concern may become of little moment and vice versa.
Hence, it is said that the advance directive may be irrelevant to the
patient's current needs and interests.135 Some commentators also make
the more radical claim that the discontinuity between the patient's state
before and after the onset of incompetence can be so great in some
instances that the patient is quite literally not the same "self" as the
person who executed the advance directive in the first place. It follows
from this argument that the "earlier" competent self would have no
moral authority to determine what is to happen to another self, that is,
to the individual who remains after the onset of incompetence. Hence,
the advance directive executed by the prior competent self need not be
honoured.13 6
This conception of theperson and personality is entirely oriented
to the present. As one critic has responded, it means one views the
person concerned "only in a highly restricted slice in time, s137 a time
134 For exponents of this view, see for example, Dresser & Robertson, supra note 7 at 236,
drawing on the work of British philosopher Derek Parfit, who argues that a person's life ought most
accurately be viewed as a series of successive selves.
135 Ibi This point is also made even relative to competent patients. See, for example, Life
Sustaining Technologies, supra note 1 at 24 and 238, noting that many health professionals are
skeptical about advance directives not only because most lay persons have difficulty understanding
the details of their condition and the treatment options, but also because the gulf between
hypothetical and actual situations is so wide. Using the example of the "terrifying ... experience of
severe breathing difficulty," one doctor commented, "patients who think they don't want to be
ventilated change their mind when they are choking to death." Ib at 428-29.
136 See Dresser & Robertson, supra note 7 at 236. For rebuttals, see Rhoden, supra note 7 at
411-12; and Buchanan & Brock, supra note 115 at 154-60.
13 7 Rhoden, supra note 7 at 411-12.
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when only very limited interests may. remain to the patient-perhaps
only physical sensations, if that. Ignoring an advance directive as
arguably not speaking to the patient's current interests after
incompetence intervenes is an approach that discounts much of what a
person was and valued in his or her life. It does not seem appropriate to
judge treatment options for once-competent patients only from the
truncated perspective of their current state.
4. The case for advance directives
Strong arguments can be made that advance directives do
facilitate self-determination, both immediately and in the longer term.
First, they allow an individual working within the framework of his or
her own value system to set the parameters of the medical conditions
under which he or she is willing to continue with life-sustaining
treatment, at least in instances where the individual's future has already
been severely circumscribed by the realities of failing health. Secondly,
advance directives also foster the individual's well-being, both in the
more immediate sense that being in control of one's fate at least in this
way enhances one's peace of mind and sense of security and, looking to
the future, in the sense that advance directives can ensure protection
from overzealous medical interventions. It is paradoxical that advance
directives enhance well-being in these ways, since promoting well-
being-acting "for the patient's own good"--is often characterized as a
paternalistic rival to autonomy in guiding medical treatment decisions.
Thirdly, while it may be a fair comment that advance directives cannot
always address all possibilities in sufficient detail to definitively
determine treatment decisions, they can still indicate the fundamental
approach to be adopted and the boundaries of what is appropriate for
the person concerned. And finally, it has been suggested that advance
directives allow one to "do good" for others as well as oneself, in the
sense of enabling an individual to relieve the emotional and financial
burden of extreme illness on family and friends by decreeing an endpoint
to continued treatment.138
In any event, despite arguments among ethicists and the practical
difficulties outlined, as a practical matter, it is not likely that our courts
will dismiss lightly advance instructions regarding treatment. The
current strong support for individual self-determination evident in many
1 3 8 See Buchanan & Brock, supra note 115 at 98.
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areas of the law,139 the decisions in Malette and Fleming recognizing that
even informal advance instructions are useful as a means of giving effect
to the highly prized value of patient autonomy, and legislation recently
passed and pending that sanctions living wills, durable powers of
attorney, and other forms of advance directives all indicate that they will
be taken very seriously indeed by the courts.
5. Formal requirements for advance directives
The decisions in Malette and Fleming would suggest that
directions respecting future care or the identity of designated decision-
makers need not have been expressed in any particular manner in order
to govern decisions made after the onset of incompetence, although that
may change if legislation is passed formalizing the status of particular
types of advance directives.140 In Malette, the patient made her refusal
of treatment known by means of a signed, undated card to that effect. In
Fleming, the patients appointed the Official Guardian as their substitute
decisionmaker and advised that office of their refusal of neuroleptic
drugs. However, it may be that the ready acceptance of the means
employed to communicate refusal of future treatment in these two cases
was the result of long-standing customary usage in the first instance and
the statutory status accorded the refusal in the second. In Malette, the
court commented that both the religious belief of Jehovah's Witnesses
regarding blood transfusions and the use of a card to transmit that
information to others were well known, certainly among health care
providers. 141 In Fleming, the patients had followed the system for
advance refusal of psychiatric treatment that was mandated by statute;
139 See, for example, Rv. Swain (1991), 63 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.) [hereinafterSwain] at 505
(principles of fundamental justice in s. 7 of the Charter contemplate a criminal justice system
founded on respect for the autonomy and dignity of human beings; therefore, it is for the accused to
determine whether to waive defence of insanity); Rodrguez, supra note 10; Morgentaler, supra note
91 (at 56, Dickson and Lamer JJ. conclude that state interference with bodily integrity and serious
state-imposed psychological stress constitutes a breach of security of the person guaranteed by s. 7
of the Charter, at least in the criminal law context; Ibu at 166 and at 171 (Wilson J. indicates that
the right to "liberty" contained in s. 7 guarantees an individual a degree of personal autonomy over
important decisions intimately affecting his or her private life, including a woman's decision
regarding abortion); and Fleming, supra note 20 at 88 (melding common law right to self-
determination and constitutional right to security of the person in context of medical treatment
decisions).
140 See discussion of the effect of living will legislation on the decision in Cruzan, supra notes
130-33 and accompanying text.
141 Supra note 31 at 433-34.
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whatever the system's shortcomings, 142 once the patients had done so,
they had done enough.
Given the very high value courts consistently place on self-
determination in medical treatment decisions, one can anticipate that
judicial recognition of even informal advance instructions will be
extended beyond these limited circumstances. Still, in choosing to
honour advance directives, courts must bear in mind that they are "not a
cost-free empowerment of persons to control their medical future"; and
they can result in the death of incompetent persons who retain
significant interests in continued lifej 43 Accordingly, while no particular
format need be followed in making one's wishes regarding future care
known, both Malette and Fleming indicate quite properly that the weight
to be accorded to any such directions ought to depend on a number of
factors, focusing on evidence probative of whether the written or oral
instructions accurately reflect the patient's intentional, freely given
directions (at least up to the onset of incompetence), and on their
applicability to the patient's present circumstances. 144
B. Patients Without Advance Directives
1. The choice of decision-makers
This article is chiefly concerned with examining whether life
support can lawfully be withheld or withdrawn from patients who are not
brain dead, and if so, the test to be applied in making this decision.
However, the type of decision-making process-the identity of the
decisionmaker and the standard of proof to be met-must also be taken
142 Referenced obliquely in the decision itself. Supra note 20 at 94.
1 4 3 Dresser & Robertson, supra note 7 at 237.
14 4 Malette, supra note 31 at 434-35; see also Fleming, supra note 20 at 94, remarking on the
different weights that might reasonably be accorded different types of communication. The Ontario
Court of Appeal recently refused to overturn the order of a lower court allowing blood transfusions
to be administered to an adult woman Jehovah's Witness following an automobile accident. She
carried a card in her purse refusing blood, but unlike Malette, her husband and ffteen-year-old son
testified she had told them she would not refuse a transfusion if her life were at risk. The judge
hearing the application in the first instance concluded that the written instructions might not reflect
the patient's actual current wishes and the appellate court held that it could not overturn that
conclusion as it did not have access to the evidence (transcripts were not yet available when the
appeal was heard, three days after the initial application). See Wingaarden v. Tzalalis (1992), 11
O.R. (3d) 779 (CA.); "Jehovah's Witness can be given blood, court rules" The Globe and Mail (29
October 1992) A16.
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into account in any consideration of these issues, as the process can
greatly affect the outcome in a particular case. By way of example, in
Cruzan, the patient's parents (who were her court-appointed guardians),
her physicians, and even her court-appointed guardian ad litem all
supported an end to her artificial feeding and hydration.145 Had the
decision been left to any or all of them, the matter would have ended
there, with a determination that artificial feeding cease. The guardian
ad litem appealed from the initial Probate Court decision, despite his
agreement that it was in the patient's best interests, only because he felt
it was his responsibility to the patient to "pursue this matter to the
highest court in the state,"146that is, because of his perception of his role
in a necessarily adversarial process. Introduction of a formally
adversarial advocate for the patient, intervention by the state Attorney-
General,1 47 and moving to an appellate court changed both the type of
decision being made (turning it into a contest over permissible
evidentiary standards), and most significantly, reversed the outcome,
since both the state Supreme Court and the United States Supreme
Court refused to authorize the withdrawal of life support. The decision-
making process made all the difference.148 It is beyond the scope of this
article to canvass exhaustively the ramifications of various types of
decision-making processes that present as possibilities when the patient
is incompetent. Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that
whatever paradigm is ultimately chosen will have its own (perhaps
decisive) effect on the outcome. It may be that in the end, the model of
decision-making settled upon will be more significant than the standard
to be applied to guide decision-makers.
In thinking about the identity of the primary decision-makers,
one cannot lose sight of the broader framework within which these
decisions are made. Whether or not the decision is that of a court or
some other obviously governmental body or the patient's family or
physician, government control is always present. Most obviously and
145 Crzan, supra note 6 at 2853, note 9.
146 /bid at 2853, note 9 and Cruzan (Mo. S.C.), supra note 130 at 410. Before the United
States Supreme Court, Cruzan's guardian filed a brief urging reversal of the Missouri Supreme
Court's decision.
147 Possibly in furtherance of a pro-life, anti-abortion agenda. See G. Annas, "The Long
Dying of Nancy Cruzan" (1991) 19 Law Med. & Health Care 52 at 56.
148 Although not ultimately, when the Attorney General withdrew from participation in the
case. At that point, the Probate Court judge determined that on the basis of the new evidence
introduced, the state's "clear and convincing evidence" standard had been met. See Martyn &
Bourguignon, supra note 6.
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most bluntly, the power of the state may well be brought to bear on
those involved in the decision-making process after the fact through
criminal, civil, and professional disciplinary proceedings. But even
where the state's presence is not so apparent, it will have intervened
already through its initial decisions allocating power over medical
treatment decisions, defining the kind of substantive and procedural
governances that it will impose on the individuals involved, and
articulating norms. As Martha Minow has perceptively commented, it is
a mistake to think that state intervention can ever be avoided in
decisions such as these.149 I do not use the concept of state intervention
here to argue that all these decisions are manifestations of government
action and therefore subject to the Charter,150 but rather, to point out
149 M. Minow, "Beyond State Intervention in the Family: Baby Jane Doe" (1985) 18 U. Mich.
J.L Reform 933 at 951-52. Minow's observation as to the pervasiveness of state involvement was
accepted by Handier J. in his concurring judgment in Jobes, supra note 73 at 461, and forms part of
his justification for judicial intervention in decisions of this nature.
150 On the meaning of "government" and "government action" in the Charter, see cases cited
supra note 20. Charter issues were raised in Eve supra note 15 at 36, a case concerning medical
treatment and an incompetent person, but in the court's view, its duty to do what it considers to be
in the incompetent person's best interests "must not ... be transformed so as to create a duty
obliging the court, at the behest of a third party, to make a choice between two alleged
constitutional rights-the right to procreate or not to procreate." Consequently, other than a brief
reference at 35 to s. 7 protecting against "laws or other state action," the Court put Charter
considerations aside. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to explore, one can still argue
that the Charter would apply to non-governmental bodies and private individuals if acting pursuant
to a statutory scheme, as in Fleming, supra note 21, and to courts making decisions about life
support. See P. Peppin, "Justice and Care: Mental Disability and Sterilization Decisions" (1989-90)
Can. H.R. Yrbk. 65 at 99-104 (courts exercising theirparenspatriae jurisdiction act as "government"
within the meaning of s. 32 of the Charter since in doing so, they represent the sovereign). Recent
cases suggest one need not make so fine a distinction in courts' functions as Peppin proposes. See
R v. Swain, supra note 139 at 502 (where the Charter is generally applicable to the litigation-in that
case, criminal proceedings -it applies to judge made common law rules as well as to statutes and
regulations); and R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588 (The Charter right to trial within a reasonable time
was breached where a trial judge adjourned defendant's application for a directed verdict twenty
times and took eleven months to reach a decision. Writing one of the four concurring opinions, La
Forest J. (with McIntyre J.) noted that "the courts, as custodians of the principles enshrined in the
Charter, must themselves be subject to Charter scrutiny in the administration of their duties." ]bid.
at 633). The strongest support can be taken from B.C.G.E.U. v. B.C., [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214 (A court-
ordered injunction prohibiting picketing of courts by government employees on lawful strike
abridged Charter right to freedom of expression but was justified under s. 1. The Charter applied as
the court was acting on its own motion and not at the instance of a private party; the court's
motivation "... is entirely 'public' in nature rather than 'private'." lbid. at 243, Dickson CJ., with
whom Lamer, Wilson, La Forest, and L'Heureux-Dub6 J. concurred. McIntyre J. also agreed that
the Charter applied, but did not find a violation of the Charter right to freedom of expression)
Generally on this topic, see P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
1992) c. 34. It has also been suggested that in any event, even if a particular Charter right was not
meant to apply in a medical context, it nonetheless shows implicitly the respect which the law has for
self-determination. See Corbeil, supra note 10 at 209, Rouleau J. quoting with approval from J.-L
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that the question of the appropriateness of judicial involvement is not
the stark one of whether to structure state intervention into personal
matters or not; the state is already involved in myriad ways.
This is not to say that since the state is always involved, judicial
approval need or ought always be sought prior to withdrawing life
support from an incompetent patient. Such a response would in many
instances be both unnecessarily cumbersome and would skew the
decision-making process in potentially undesirable ways. Nor is it to say
that the form of state intervention does not matter. As Minow points
out, the state's decisions as to the allocation of power (even if "decided"
only by default, by silence) are not neutral; they have their own effect on
the results.151 This would be true of increasing or formalizing judicial
involvement in advance of a decision to withdraw life support as well.
The commencement of court proceedings typically presents a sharp and
often unwelcome departure from the preceding decision-making
processes. For a graphic illustration of the power that underlies state
determinations regarding the locus of decision-making authority and the
type of decision-making process, we need only look to the decision in
Cruzan. There, introducing a formal adversarial process changed the
decision making from a contextualized inquiry into the patient's
circumstances to an abstract debate about permissible evidentiary
standards. The issue became a procedural one, although clearly with a
significant substantive content, as it supported a substantive
determination diametrically opposed to the considered judgment of all
those more closely involved with the patient.1 5 2
Conversely, keeping courts out of the decision-making process is
not to be understood as the state having carved out a boundary limiting
state intervention in, for instance, families and personal autonomy.
Rather, it simply indicates the different substantive and procedural
governances of the family or the individual which the state has
undertaken153-for instance, through allocating power to the attending
physician, hospital prognosis committee, ethicists, or other government
officials. These allocations of power to particular mechanisms and
Baudouin, Justice Beyond Onvell (Montreal: Yvon Blais Inc., 1985). More generally, the Supreme
Court of Canada has held that even where no reliance is placed on any specific provision of the
Charter, "the values embodied in the Charter must be given preference over an interpretation which
would run contrary to them." See Hills v. Canada (AG.), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 513 at 558, L'Heureux-
Dub6 J., citing and relying on Dolphin Delivery, supra note 20; and Manitoba (AG.) v. Metropolitan
Stores Ltd, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110.
151 Supra note 149 at 952.
152 See P. Brest, "The Substance of Process" (1981) 42 Ohio State L Rev. 131.
153 Minow, supra note 149 at 952.
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participants are no more neutral than leaving decision making to the
courts, and will also affect results.
Whether there should be judicial involvement in these decisions
at all in the normal course and, if so, what role the legal system should
play remain unanswered questions. We can predict with reasonable
certainty that these are not decisions Canadian courts are likely to leave
entirely to individual physicians, family members, or hospital ethics
committees, particularly where there is disagreement over the
appropriate course of action. In Eve, one of the Supreme Court of
Canada's few recent decisions concerning medical intervention and a
decisionally incapable person, the Court somewhat cryptically staked out
this territory as at least potentially suitable for judicial intervention 5 4
Although it was dealing with a different issue-the proposed
sterilization of an incompetent young woman-it specifically raised and
left open the question whether courts should permit the removal of life-
sustaining equipment, obviously viewing this as an area in which court
approval may be required. One can expect that, given the courts'parens
patriae power, they will be vigilant to ensure that the rights and interests
of those who are incompetent are protected (at least in those instances
in which someone brings the matter to court).
What few comments there are from lower courts seem to
indicate they are of two minds with respect to their role. On the one
hand, there is the very activist role unnecessarily (and therefore possibly
more pointedly) claimed by the Quebec Superior Court for judges in
questions of life or death in Institut Philipe Pinel de Montrgal v. Dion.155
That case granted an application by a psychiatric institution for a
declaration that it had the authority to force an inmate being held under
a Lieutenant Governor's warrant to undergo drug therapy and
psychiatric treatment for his schizophrenia. The court considered the
judiciary to have a non-delegable duty to determine such questions. The
judge seemed to go out of his way to reject "any attempt to shift the
ultimate decision making responsibility away from the duly established
court ... to any committee, panel or group [i.e., physicians or ethics
committees]." 156 Although it was faced with a very different issue, thus
154 Supra note 15 at 29. However, by the time of the British Columbia Court of Appeal's
decision just over five years later in Rodriguez v. B.C. (A.G.), [1993] 3 W.W.R. 553 at 571,
McEachern CJ. simply assumed that courts allow the withdrawal of life support from persons who
are incompetent where that is seen as medically appropriate.
155 (1983), 2 D.LR. (4th) 234 (Que. S.C.) [hereinafter Dion].
156 Ibd at 242, quoting from the American case, Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d. 417 at 434 (Mass. 1977) [hereinafter Saikewicz].
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making this particular reference'unnecessary to support its decision, the
court nonetheless quoted with approval from an American decision,
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, which
considered whether to authorize chemotherapy for an incompetent long-
term adult resident of a state school who was suffering from leukaemia
and who had no relatives interested in taking part in the decision:
We do not view the judicial resolution of this most difficult and awesome
question-whether potentially life-prolonging treatment should be withheld from a
person incapable of making his own decision-as constituting a 'gratuitous
encroachment' on the domain of medical expertise. Rather, such questions of life and
death seem to us to require the process of detached but passionate investigation and
decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of government was created.
Achieving this ideal is our responsibility ... and is not to be entrusted to any other group
purporting to represent the single 'morality and conscience of our society' no matter how
highly motivated or impressively constitutedL
15 7
In the end result, the American court did not authorize the
chemotherapy; the Quebec court authorized the hospital to treat.1 58
In contrast, the British Columbia Court of Appeal in
Astaforoffl59 expressed chagrin that the question of whether prison
officials had a duty to force-feed Mary Astaforoff had been brought
before it at all. It characterized the case as primarily a dispute between
the federal and provincial governments and chided them for not taking
steps to avoid the impasse without involving the courts. The
Saskatchewan Provincial Court in Re Minister of Social Services and P.
160
seemed to be of the view that a parental decision refusing a life-saving
transplant operation for their child was not properly the concern of
either the judicial or the child protection branches of the state, provided
it met the baseline of falling within the bounds of current medical
opinion and social mores. Of the physicians called as witnesses, only one
insisted that a transplant was the treatment of choice; the others were of
the view that given the burdens and risks associated with the operation
and its aftermath, either decision-to seek a transplant or not-was
157 Sakewlc, ibid at 435.
158 Courts in the United States are divided in their decisions as to the need for court
authorization prior to withdrawing life support, and the statement relied on in Dion should not be
taken as a definitive statement of the American position. In Massachusetts, In the Matter of Sprin&
399 N.E.2d 493 (Mass. App. 1979) marked the beginning of the withdrawal from the strong role
Saikewicz staked out for courts in that state. More recently, see Brophy, supra note 73. For
discussion of the situation in the United States more generally, see notes 165-69 and accompanying
text.
159 Supra note 34 at 389-90.
160 (1990), 69 D.L.R. (4th) 134 [hereinafter Re P.
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acceptable. However, in Couture-Jacquet,161 the Quebec Court of
Appeal upheld a parent's refusal of a repetition of chemotherapy for her
child in the face of physicians' recommendations to the contrary and the
hospital's application for authorization to treat. In N.B. (Minister of
Health and Community Services) v. RB. and S.B.,162 the New Brunswick
Court of Queen's Bench granted the Minister temporary custody of a
ten-year-old severely mentally retarded and neurologically handicapped
child and authorized medical treatment (antibiotics for meningitis and
an accompanying infection in the area of a shunt). Her parents had
objected to the treatment, and, as in Re P., there was a difference of
opinion among physicians as to whether she should be treated. In this
case, though, the court in a very brief judgment held that a decision not
to treat would constitute discrimination against the child on the basis of
her disability and hence, would be contrary to the Charter. Even if
further medical treatment prolonged her suffering, it would also prolong
her life, and "[t]hat life, however low its quality, is her right."163 It
seems, then, that there is not as yet consensus even among courts as to
their proper role or the appropriate role for the other participants in the
decision-making process when the patient is incompetent.
Nor will provisions to be found in some provincial legislation to
the effect that parents, guardians, or next of kin can consent to surgical
operations, diagnostic tests, or medical treatment or procedures on
behalf of persons unable to give consent themselves necessarily suffice to
remove these issues from the purview of the courts.1 64 The Supreme
Court of Canada has held that the purpose of such regulations is not to
define the rights of individuals, but rather, to provide for the governing
of hospitals so as to protect them from civil liability.165 The Court added
that these regulations were not intended to and do not provide a system
161 Supra note 79. The small chance of success the treatment offered and the very great
suffering and physical damage it would surely cause were significant in the court's decision to put an
end to the well-intentioned therapeutic relentlessness of the medical establishment.
162 (1990), 106 N.B. (2d) 206 (Q.B.) [hereinafter/RB. and S.B.].
163 Ibid. at 211.
164 See, for example, 0. Reg. 965/90, ss. 25 (1)(c), 26 (2)(c), made under the Public Hospitals
Ac4 R.S.O. 1990, c.P.40. Nova Scotia, Quebec, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan, and New
Brunswick have also made provision for substitute consent by next of kin if the patient is in need of
immediate treatment; in Alberta, a guardian must be appointed. See Alberta Law Reform Institute,
Advance Directives and Substitute Decision-Making in Personal Health Care (Report for Discussion
No. 11) (Edmonton, November 1991) at 7-8 and 21-22.
165 Ev4 supra note 15 at 13. One would expect the analysis would differ where the legislation
is obviously intended to have this effect, as is the case with the new wave of legislation in Ontario
and other provinces. See supra note 12.
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for the determination of human rights, which are primarily at issue in
decisions such as these. The courts' silence in this area to date, then,
merely indicates that the issue has not yet come squarely before them for
determination. For all the reasons outlined at the outset of this
article-continued technological advances, increased public awareness,
legislative activity, interest group involvement, financial pressures on the
health care system, and uncertainty as to standards among health care
providers-we can expect that courts will be confronted with questions
surrounding the provision of life-support to incompetent patients in the
near future. 166
Despite the longer American history of judicial involvement in
this area, the judicial procedure when a decision is to be made as to
whether life support can be terminated, and indeed, the appropriateness
of judicial involvement at all, are not settled in the United States
either.1 67 Madam Justice O'Connor in her concurring judgment in
Cruzan summarized the state of the law in that country when she noted
that there is no national consensus on these matters and that
consequently, they are most appropriately left to the "laboratories" of
the individual states.168
One theme that does emerge very frequently in the American
decisions is the repeated expression of the view that an adversarial
judicial proceeding is not the appropriate institutional setting in which to
resolve these issues. The American courts frequently urge that
legislative guidelines be established, a sentiment that is echoed by judges
166 Relative to competent patients, see Nancy B, Corbei, and Rodriguez, supra note 10.
167 To take just a few examples, in New Jersey, see In the Matter of QuInlan, 355 A.2d 658
(NJ.S.C. 1976) [hereinafter Quinlan] (dispensing with the need for court approval of a decision to
withdraw a patient from a respirator if there is concurrence among the guardian, family, attending
physician, and a hospital prognosis committee); and Conroy, supra note 88 (developing a procedure
when decisions were to be made regarding the termination of life-support systems for nursing home
patients, requiring a guardian and intervention by what might loosely be termed a government
ombudsman for the elderly, effectively shifting the decision making in part to an administrative
branch of the state); in New York, see Dello, supra note 112 (anticipating regular judicial
intervention to determine these matters); in California, see Barber v. Superior Court of California,
195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. App. 1983) [hereinafter Barber] (holding that the decision may be made by
a surrogate with the advice of the patient's physician and that there need not be a court-appointed
guardian); in Washington, see In the Matter of Guardianship of Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372 (Cal. App.
1984) [hereinafter Hamlin] (recognizing that varying degrees of procedural safeguards may be
necessary to protect against abuse, depending primarily on the incompetent patient's family
situation. Safeguards range from agreement among the patient's family or court-appointed
guardian, the attending physician, and the hospital prognosis committee through to a requirement
of judicial approval).
168 Cruzan, supra note 6 at 2859.
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in the United Kingdom. 169 This sense of institutional inadequacy and
maladaptation may in part underlie the frequent court-developed
formalization of a role for prognosis committees, ombudsmen for the
elderly, and others who can assist in reaching what becomes a collective
judgment. The aim is presumably not only to share and ease the
responsibility,170 but also to make it a more widely informed and hence,
better judgment.171
2. Existing guidance principles in decision making
We have seen that where the patient is competent, courts
increasingly support his or her right to self-determination in medical
treatment decisions. When a patient becomes decisionally incapable but
has left advance instructions regarding medical care, Malette and Fleming
indicate that those instructions will be honoured1 2  The approach
courts will take in determining whether life support can be withheld or
withdrawn is much less clear when considering the situation of a never-
competent patient or someone once-competent who left no clear
instructions about the use of life support. Difficulties in decision making
are exacerbated when the patient is not facing imminent death so long as
life support is continued. In jurisdictions where the issue has been
considered by courts and commentators, two major models of decision
169 See, for example, In the Matter of Farrel4 529 A.2d 404 [hereinafter Farrell] at 407 (NJ.S.C.
1987); Satz v. Perlmutter 379 So.2d 359 at 360 (Fla. 1980). But see In the Matter of the
Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 [hereinafter Torres] at 341 (Min. S.C. 1984) where three
judges joined in a concurring opinion expressing the view that life support ought not be withdrawn
from an incompetent patient without prior judicial approval even when there is unanimity among
physician, family, and hospital ethics committee. In the United Kingdom, see Airedale Trust; supra
note 27 at 392, Lord Mustill.
170 A suggestion made in P. Mnookin, "Two Puzzles" (1984) Ariz. St. LJ. 667 at 683.
1 71 This is clearly the view of Handler J. in Jobes, supra note 73 at 460; see also AucklandArea
Health Board, supra note 112 at 255, and the reliance placed on guidelines developed by the national
medical association in Airedale Trus supra note 27. See for example, Lord Goff at 373-76. The
tendency on the part of courts to encourage a wider involvement in the decision-making process has
been attacked as a dangerous delegation of courts' immunity-granting authority that will encourage
an abdication of the responsibility owed to the incompetent patient by health care providers, the
patient's family, and ultimately, the state. See Burt, supra note 25 at 165-73; Annas, supra note 132
at 26. Veatch, supra note 98 at 143-48, sounds a somewhat different cautionary note respecting
reliance on decision making by ethics committees with respect to a particular patient. He is
concerned that such committees are "essentially private groups, appointed through private
channels" with "no publicly authorized operating rules." IbUi at 145. As such, they lack a publicly
accepted authority to make such decisions or rules and procedures for doing so.
1 72 Malett4 supra note 31 and F/eming, supra note 20.
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making have emerged, one based on a concept of substituted judgment
and the other on the patient's best interests. When surrogate decision-
makers formulate a substituted judgment, they try to establish as
accurately as possible what decision the patient would make if he or she
were competent to do so but could take into account the reality of his or
her own incapacity as a factor in the decision.1 73 If the determination is
to be made on the basis of the patient's best interests, the surrogate
decisionmaker assesses the patient's needs and the risks and advantages
of the medical intervention to determine the net burdens and benefits
the patient will derive from life with and without the treatment.1 74 Both
decision making models will be examined in greater detail.
3. Substituted judgment: the American experience
Questions surrounding the standard to be applied in decisions
regarding life support and incompetent patients have been explored
most fully in the United States. For that reason, it is helpful to review
and analyze developments of the law in that country.175 Ever since the
well-known case allowing Karen Quinlan's removal from a respirator in
1976,176 American courts have authorized termination of life support in
certain situations, and have confirmed that doing so would not result in
criminal or civil liability. They have differed among themselves,
however, on the basis for the decision when the patient is
incompetent-is it to be made in the best interests of the patient, or is it
to be based on a concept of substituted judgment or surrogate consent
exercised on behalf of the patient? The dominant approach since the
decision in Quinlan has been the substituted judgment standard,
177
173 President's Commission, supra note 6 at 132; see, for example, Jobes, supra note 73 at 444-
45; In Re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 [hereinafter Longeway] at 299-300 (l. 1989).
174 Presidents' Commission, ibid. at 135; for applications of this model, see Torres, supra note
169; Rasmussen v. F/eming 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. S.C. 1987) [hereinafter Rasmussen]; and Re C, supra
note 114.
175 Familiarity with American jurisprudence in this area is also important because, as the
British Columbia Royal Commission on Health Care and Costs notes, Canadian physicians tend to
act as though the law in Canada is the same as the United States even, though this may not be the
case. See Closer to Home supra note 113 at C-184.
176 Quinlan, supra note 167.
177 See, for example, Longeway, supra note 173; Conroy, supra note 88; lobes, supra note 73;
Barber, supra note 167 at 491-92; In the Matter of Hier, 464 N.E.2d 959 (Mass. App. 1984); Re A.C.,
supra note 50 at 1249-51 (applying substituted judgment test regarding a caesarian section to be
performed on a terminally ill woman).
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essentially attempting to effectuate for incompetent patients the same
rights competent patients have to choose and refuse medical treatment,
albeit through arrangements by which those rights are exercised for the
incompetent individual by others. Where there is not acceptable
evidence that the patient expressed any explicit intent, then many courts
have allowed a proxy decisionmaker to base the determination on the
patient's relevant values and preferences expressed when competent. 78
Each of these tests is considered to result in a determination of the
(now-incompetent) patient's intent, and the exercise of the patient's right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment 7 9 The standard of proof of the
patient's choice varies among the different courts that have considered
these matters,18 0 but the general analytical approach remains consistent.
The substituted judgment standard has been severely
criticized.181 At times, the efforts American courts engage in to imagine
incompetent individuals as they were or would be if competent, as wel
as to deduce what the individuals' decisions were respecting life support,
degenerate into unconvincing contortions. This is particularly so when
courts attempt to apply this analysis to patients who were never
competent and so could never have made the decision themselves,18 2 or
178 The substituted judgment test was commented on extensively in Conroy, ibid. at 1229-30,
and was developed further in Jobes, ibid. at 445. Sometimes, courts appear to elide analyses of a
proxy acting on an expressed choice and one acting on a perceived preference. See for example, In
the Matter of Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (NJ. 1987) [hereinafter Peter] and Jobes, supra note 73, where the
New Jersey Supreme Court permitted the guardians of patients in a persistent vegetative state to
have the patients' life support withdrawn even without clear and convincing evidence of the
patients' intent, on the basis of the guardians' best judgment as to what the patients would have
wanted. The court still characterised this exercise as "extrapolat[ing] the patient's choice." See
.obes, ibid. at 444.
179 See, for example, the language used in Longeway, supra note 173 at 300 to describe the
analytical process and its results.
180 Indeed, the appropriate standard of proof was the issue that confronted the United States
Supreme Court in Cruzan, supra note 6. As Justice O'Connor noted in her concurring opinion at
2859, there is no "national consensus" in the United States as to the best solution to these difficult
questions. That being the case, in her view, these matters are better left to individual states to
resolve.
181 For example, Rhoden, supra note 7 at 386; and Dresser & Robertson, supra note 7 at 234-
35 and at 238-39.
182 A particularly striking example of this can be seen in Saikewicz, supra note 156, where the
court purported to express the "choice" to refuse treatment of a profoundly retarded long-term
resident of a state hospital who was suffering from leukaemia. The court decided that he should not
undergo chemotherapy even though most competent people suffering from the disease would
choose to do so. It based its decision both on the limitations of the treatment and the patient's
inability to understand and therefore tolerate the pain associated with treatment. The reasoning
(although not necessarily the result) has been roundly criticized by both commentators and courts in
the United States. See, for example, In Re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981); and A. Buchanan,
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to patients about whom there is no reliable evidence from which to form
a picture of the individual's value system and treatment preferences.
Invoking the justification that the judicial decision merely elucidates the
"patient's choice" is just not credible in these circumstances.
Consequently, for the most part now, where the patient's intent relative
to the use of life support cannot be determined,183 or where a statute so
directs,/8 4 American courts have adopted a best interests approach to
determine the course of treatment to be followed. In applying that
standard, courts do factor in quality of life considerations, although they
commonly disavow any such characterization of their reasoning 8 5
Quality of life is considered not in the sense of measuring the utility or
worth of this person's life compared to others, but rather in the sense of
trying to comprehend what life is like for the particular patient. 8 6
Courts weigh what they are told of the patient's character, lifestyle and
preferences, the invasiveness of particular treatment, and whether the
treatment is proportionate in terms of the benefit to be gained as against
the burden caused to reach a conclusion as to this patient's best
interests. One can see that the inquiries in which courts engage to
determine patients' best interests and formulate appropriate substituted
judgments may approach each other very closely, if not conflate.
4. Evaluating the substituted judgment standard
The American approach seems to reflect a concentration on
individual rights and equality common in many areas of American law,
attempting to effectuate for incompetent patients the same right
competent patients have to refuse treatment. The primacy given the
right of the individual to decide how his or her fate is to be acted out, the
juxtaposition of the individual against the state (the latter being aligned
with the full panoply of medical technology), and the "win"--the
"Medical Paternalism or Legal Imperialism: Not the Only Alternatives for Handling Saikewicz-Type
Cases" 5 Am. J. Law and Medicine 97.
183 As in Rasmussen, supra note 174 at 689.
184 See, for example, Torres, supra note 169, interpreting a conservatorship statute; see also
Hamlin, supra note 167.
185 See, for example, Brophy, supra note 73 at 635.
186 See for example, Rasmussen, supra note 174 at 689; Torres, supra note 169 at 338-39. In
the United Kingdom, the House of Lords has indicated that if the personality of the patient is
relevant to the application of the best interests test, it may be taken into account, although where
the patient is in a persistent vegetative state it is difficult to see how knowing about the patient's
personality can assist, other than to comfort the patient's relatives with the thought that he or she
would not have wanted to live; Airedale Trus4 supra note 27 at 375, Lord Goff
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vindication of the individual's rights-perceived when a court allows life
support to be withdrawn, all evidence this tilt. Given Americans' almost
forty-year history of a very activist use of the constitutional right to equal
protection in many different contexts, the underlying theme of
recognizing and effecting equality in the ability to decide for oneself that
is implicit although not usually explored in these decisions18 7 must
resonate with American courts and the wider society as correct-so
obviously correct that it can be taken for granted.
An analytical approach recognizing that incompetent patients
have rights when decisions are made about their lives, that they are
"similarly situated" to competent patients requiring life support (to use
the classic American formulation triggering the Equal Protection
Clause),188 and that incompetent patients have the same right that
competent persons take for granted-the right to make and carry out
decisions, even if through intermediariesl 89-is appealing. This is
especially so as society becomes increasingly sensitive to the multitude of
unacceptable ways in which incompetent persons (and disabled persons
generally, whether competent or not) are treated paternalistically and
often needlessly as not "like us," as distanced from the competent
decision-makers in the mainstream of society. The concept that the
decisionmaker is expressing the patient's choice emphasized in these
cases can also help in easing feelings of responsibility, guilt, and anguish
over difficult, painful decisions, as well as give some direction to the
decision-making process. Additionally, it enables courts to address their
sense of discomfort, inappropriateness, and incompetence at being
called on to make these decisions by transferring responsibility for the
decision back to someone perceived to be better situated to decide,
187 Some American courts have considered the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause in
this context. See, for example, the concurring judgment of Scalia, J. in Cruzan, supra note 6 at 2863,
basing his conclusion that there are limits on the extent to which an individual can be required to
preserve his own life on the Equal Protection Clause, while at the same time paradoxically insisting
that the American Constitution has "nothing to say" on this subject. See also Rasmussen, supra note
174 at 686, quoting with approval from Eichner v. Dillon, 426 N.Y.S. 2d 517 at 542-3, aff'd 438
N.Y.S. 2d 266, cert. denied 102 S. CL 309 (CtApp. 1981), where it was held that competent and
incompetent patients have a right to equal treatment both in the content and the exercise of the
right to refuse medical treatment.
188 See . Tussman & J. ten Broek, "The Equal Protection of the Laws" (1948) 37 Cal. L Rev.
341.
189 American cases seem to take for granted not only that incompetent patients retain a right
of self-determination relative to the use of life-support, but also that they have an additional right to
an effective means to assert that choice even if indirectly, at least when there is someone who will
act on the patient's behalf to arrange to have life support withdrawn. See, for example, Rasmussen,
supra note 174 at 686.
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generally a family member or friend with closer ties to, and more
intimate knowledge of, the patient 90 The court can thus present its
task and its decision as preserving an area of autonomy and privacy for
the patient's family or close friends acting with medical advice, and can
claim rather disingenuously that it is not presuming to make the decision
itself, but merely deciding whether to sanction it.191
The American approach, beginning as it does with solid respect
for the patient's autonomy and right to self-determination, has much to
commend it. A number of the cases show, however, that it can become
highly problematic when applied in practice. This is particularly evident
when the person concerned never could or did clearly express his or her
wishes relative to the medical intervention in question, or when, as is
frequently the case with elderly long-term residents of a nursing home or
other chronic care institution, the patient lacks the close family or
friends through whom he or she could "speak." Despite this criticism,
when limited to appropriate circumstances where there is reliable
evidence, a substituted judgment standard can be a valuable way to
approach issues surrounding the provision of life support. It is
underpinned by the same core idea as advance directives, and responds
to many of the same concerns. Both seek to ensure to the greatest
extent possible that decisions about the use of life support are grounded
in and express the patients' own wishes and values. Doing so advances
concepts of autonomy, dignity, and self-determination, values to which
our courts and society more generally are currently highly committed,
especially in matters of bodily and personal integrity.192 Thus, even
where one cannot reach the sometimes imaginative heights of being able
to identify the patient's explicit "choice" relative to life support, as long
as the patient's preferences can be reliably ascertained, a substituted
190 The sentiment that courts are not the appropriate forum for making such decisions is
repeatedly expressed in these decisions. See, for example, Farrell, supra note 169 at 407, where the
court reiterated its earlier statement that the legislature is the proper branch to set guidelines in this
area. See also Barber, supra note 167 at 486, commenting on charges of murder and conspiracy to
commit murder laid against a physician who, at the family's request, withdrew artificial nutrition and
hydration from a patient in a persistent vegetative state. Noting the legislature's failure to
adequately address the legal and moral considerations the case raised, Compton J. referenced an
earlier decision in which a court had pointedly observed, "[P]rosecution of a lawsuit is a poor way to
design a motor vehicle." He added, "By analogy it appears to us that a murder prosecution is a poor
way to design an ethical and moral code for physicians who are faced with decisions concerning the
use of costly and extraordinary 'life support' equipment."
191 See, for example, Jobes, supra note 73 at 436-37. For a critical assessment of courts'
delegation of what has been called their "immunity-granting authority," see Burt, supra note 25 at
170-71 and Annas, supra note 132 at 24 and at 26.
192 See cases cited supra note 139.
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judgment standard is the approach that most accords respect to the
patient as a whole person and is most consistent with our societal
emphasis on self-determination and autonomy.
5. The best interests test
Even though a few Canadian cases have made reference to
Quinlan and some of the decisions that have followed in the United
States,193 considerable caution must be exercised in relying on American
jurisprudence in this area. The Supreme Court of Canada in Eve
considered and firmly rejected the American substituted judgment test,
although in a very different context-the non-therapeutic sterilization of
a mentally incompetent young adult for purposes of contraception. The
Court characterized it as "fiction" and "sophistry" to suggest that its
choice or anyone else's could be that of the incompetent person, adding
that what he or she would do is sheer speculation 9 4 Rather, it settled
on a best interests test to decide questions of medical intervention, at
least when the person concerned has always been decisionally incapable.
A different analysis might be accepted in the case of a patient who has
become incapacitated but, while still competent, clearly rejected the idea
of life support. This is particularly so given the emphasis on self-
determination evident in judicial decisions since the passage of the
Charter. However, at least for the never-competent patient and the
once-competent patient whose wishes cannot be reliably discerned, the
decision will be based on the patient's best interests.195
It still remains to infuse that standard with content. How should
a court, or for that matter, any decisionmaker determine whether
discontinuing life support is in a patient's best interests? Although
considering a very different type of medical intervention, the Court in
Eve gave some idea of its view of the nature of the task, acknowledging
that a goal of determining best interests provides a less than precise
standard and shapes a less than workable inquiry. The Court quoted
with approval from an American decision, Re Guardianship of Eberhardy:
No one who has dealt with this standard [i.e, 'best interests'] has expressed complete
satisfaction with it. It is not an objective test, and it is not intended to be. The substantial
193 See, for example, Goyette, supra note 85 at 431; Dion, supra note 155.
194 Ev4 supra note 15 at 35. See also Airedale Tns4 supra note 27 at 395.
195 This is also the test adopted in the United Kingdom (seeAiredale Tnrs4 ibid. at 370 and at
375) and New Zealand (seeAucklandArea Health Board, supra note 112 at 252).
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workability of the test rests upon the informed fact-finding and wise exercise of discretion
by trial courts engendered by long experience with the standard.19 6
In seeming contradiction, the court in Eberhardy then expressed doubts
as to the ability of the judiciary to properly discharge this task at all,
particularly in the absence of "well thought-out policy determinations
reflecting the interests of society, as well as of the person. "197 A court
has the unenviable task of assessing the needs, risks, benefits, and
burdens for the affected person from an external stance. Then, knowing
it has only part of the picture and with little other guidance as to the
content with which to infuse the standard, it must decide.
Legal commentators and some American and English courts
have tried to establish a framework for that decision making. Originally,
a distinction was posited between ordinary and extraordinary treatment,
with the characterization determined not only by the treatment itself but
by the patient's clinical prognosis with and without that treatment, such
that extraordinary treatment could be rejected by or withheld from a
patient in a terminal condition, but ordinary treatment must be
provided.198 That distinction has now been largely rejected as
unworkably indeterminate, as it is not a classification on which
consensus is possible either medically or in society at large. 199 More
recently, it has been suggested that the decision to initiate or continue
life support should be based on a determination as to whether the
treatment is proportionate or disproportionate in terms of the benefit to
be gained as against the burden caused. Conclusions are largely
dependent on the patient's prognosis-how long the treatment will
extend life and under what conditions. 20 1
196 E0, supra note 15 at 33, quoting Re Guardianship of Eberhardy, 294 N.W.2d 540 (WisApp.
1980).
19 7 1bid
198 See, for example, Quilan, supra note 167 at 355, where the distinction was drawn from
largely Catholic theological roots (the Quinlans themselves were Catholic). The distinction is
commonly found in other religious and secular traditions as well; see Burt, supra note 25 at 162-63.
See also Dickens, supra note 30 at 855-59.
199 President's Commission, supra note 6 at 82-89; Closer to Home, supra note 113 at C-180-1.
200 For applications of this guidance principle, see, for example, Barber, supra note 167 at 491-
92; Conroy, supra note 88 at 1232; Goyetae, supra note 85; Re C, supra note 114 at 784-87. But see
Airedale Trus4 supra note 27 at 371-72, Lord Goff, pointing out that when the patient is in a
persistent vegetative state, there is no weighing to be performed, as the permanently unconscious
patient can feel nothing and there is no prospect of improvement in the patient's condition.
201 Another manner of phrasing the analysis that runs through some American decisions is the
suggestion of a sliding balance between the interests of the individual and those of the state, such
that as the patient's prognosis dims and the invasiveness and burden of the procedures proposed
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The House of Lords in its 1993 decision, Airedale Trust
concluded unanimously (although in five separate judgments) that where
the patient is in a persistent vegetative state and there is no hope of any
improvement in his condition, then life-prolonging treatment (artificial
nutrition and hydration and antibiotic therapy) is neither appropriate
nor required because it is useless. 202 It follows, then, that preserving
biologic existence is not a required goal of medical treatment.203 The
permanent and complete loss of any level of cognitive sapient life
justifies ending life support. While one could not say that the patient's
best interests lay in ending life, neither could it be said that his interests
were served by continuing treatment. Indeed, some of the judges went
so far as to suggest that once it has been determined that the treatment
is not in the patient's best interests, then doctors not only have no duty
but no right to continue with it and that doing so could constitute battery
and trespass to the person of the patient.2 4 It follows from this analysis
that irreversible unconsciousness shifts the framework of the decision
making. It makes no sense to base treatment decisions for a patient in a
persistent vegetative state on his or her best interests, because his or her
interests are "null."205 The judgment is carefully limited to patients
lacking all consciousness and without any prospect of any recovery. As
increases, the weight to be accorded to the individual's right to decline treatment must increase and
that accorded to the state's interest in preserving life, decrease. See, for example, Quinlan, supra
note 167 at 664; and Brophy, supra note 73 at 635. For a critical view of this approach, see A.
Capron, "Borrowed Lessons: The Role of Ethical Distinctions in Framing Law on Life-Sustaining
Treatment" (1984) Ariz. State L.J. 647 at 648-55. The point has also been made that where the
patient is in a persistent vegetative state, he or she has no current interests and does not experience
benefits or burdens, making this paradigm inapplicable. See Peter, supra note 178 at 425; Airedale
Trust, supra note 27 at 361, Lord Keith and at 398, Lord MustilL
202 Supra, note 27 at 371-72, Lord Goff. See also AucklandArea Health Board, supra note 112
at 245 to the same effect, although with respect to almost the converse situation: "a brain destitute
of a body," rather than "a body devoid of a mind."
2 03 The Court did not mean by this that human beings can necessarily be reduced to physical
existence and "that combination of manifold characteristics which we call a personality," or to deny
that the human condition may also comprise a "distinct spiritual essence," but rather, to accept that
in arriving at its decision, it can only proceed on the basis of "what we do know." We cannot know
whether there is such a spiritual essence distinct from both body and personality, nor whether it
perishes with death or transcends it. On the basis of what is known, the Court concluded that the
patient's best interests no longer demanded continuance of his present care and treatment. Ibid. at
400, Lord Mustill.
204 Ibid. at 379, Lord Lowry and at 385, Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
205 Ibid. at 400, Lord Mustil and at 361, Lord Keith. Some of the judges do, however,
continue to use the rubric of "best interests," although in connection with the patient's interests in
continuing rather than in discontinuing treatment. The focus, then, is on weighing the patient's
interests in the alternative to withdrawal of life support, continued life, rather than the patient's
interests in ending the treatment.
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Lord Mustill noted, "I might not decide the same ... where the
glimmerings of awareness may give the patient an interest which cannot
be regarded as null."206
6. Evaluating the best interests standard
None of these tests, though, tell us how the particular calculus
settled upon is to be worked out. How does one weigh the burdens and
benefits? What scale does one use? It is clear from the judgments that
at least in terms of overtly acknowledged values, the only interests to be
considered are those of the patient, not the interests of his or her family
or friends, or those charged with the patient's care, or society at large.
207
Some critics of the best interests model have asserted, however, that
despite courts' statements to the contrary, other directed considerations
are already taken into account in decision making. They argue that
courts and other influential bodies allow such factors to shape non-
treatment decisions by introducing these considerations as part of the
assessment of the burdens treatment imposes on the patient, all the
while formally denying that the interests of others have any role to play
in that determination.208 Others respond that to omit these factors
completely is to conceive of the patient as an entirely self-centered
person with no thought or care for the burden on others. It is argued
206 Ibid. at 400.
207 Ev supra note 15 at 29. In the United Kingdom, however, the Court of Appeal recently
explicitly confirmed that local health authorities can take the gravity of the patient's condition and
the prognosis into account in allocating scarce medical resources. Re J., supra note 73. It must be
borne in mind, however, that limits on health care are much more prevalent, open, and accepted in
the United Kingdom than in Canada, leading to different perceptions and-expectations of the health
care system; see R. Baker, "The Inevitability of Health Care Rationing: A Case Study of Rationing
in the British National Health Service," in MA. Strosberg, et aL, RationingAmerica'sMedical Care:
The Oregon Plan and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992) at 208-30. However,
see Airedale Trust, supra note 27 at 397, Lord Mustill, noting that the interests of others-the "best
interests of the community"-is an issue for Parliament, not the courts.
208 See, for example, Dresser & Robertson, supra note 7 at 239. For examples of analyses
suggesting burdens on others as an appropriate consideration in determining the burden of
continued treatment on the patient, see, for example, Brophy, supra note 73 at 635-36; Cruzan, supra
note 6 at 2869, Brennan J. and at 2890, Stevens J. (dissenting) (patient's interest in not having her
family's happy memories of her destroyed should be taken into account); more generally, see
Hastings Center, Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and the Care of the
Dying (New York- The Hastings Center, 1987) at 26-27 (burdens on patients in persistent vegetative
state include financial cost and emotional strain on loved ones); "The Appleton International
Conference: Developing Guidelines for Decisions to Forego Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment"
(1992) 18 (S) J. Med. Ethics 1 (in determining a patient's best interests, most persons ordinarily
would want inter ala to avoid being a severe burden on others).
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that such an analysis is itself neither desirable nor realistic, particularly if
one recognizes the importance of bearing in mind the whole person in
decision making, both before and after the onset of incompetence. 209
The traditional best interests test has also been criticized for the
narrowness of the circumstances in which non-treatment is permissible,
which sometimes seem to have been limited to situations where
treatment would cause or could not alleviate active, irremediable harm
to the patient. In light of this, it has been suggested that, rather than
framing the analysis in terms of whether death would be better for this
patient than the harm of continued existence and treatment, 210 one
should rather judge whether, from the incompetent patient's current
perspective, his or her continued existence is a sufficient good to the
patient to justify further treatment (a "current interests" test) or whether
continued treatment is in the patient's interests.211 Changing the focus
of the question asked from the harm of continued life to the good that
would come from continued life or treatment makes sense if the patient
is in a persistent vegetative state. By definition, such patients no longer
experience anything, and in that sense, they are neither harmed nor
helped by continued treatment (except in the highly theoretical
eventuality that a cure for their condition is eventually discovered) 2 12
The difficulty with the change in analytical framework suggested is one
of limits. Patients who are barely conscious may not be so different from
patients in a persistent vegetative state.2 3 When the patient retains
some degree of consciousness, our fundamental inability to take the
perspective of an incompetent person in so profoundly compromised a
condition remains. Whether we ask about the harm of continued
treatment or the good of continued existence, where the patient still
retains some consciousness but is in a severely disabled state and we lack
any reliable basis for a substituted judgment, we cannot know what life is
209 Burt, supra note 25 at 151-52.
210 The approach taken, for instance, in Dawson, discussed infra notes 228-30 and
accompanying text.
211 As to the former, see Dresser & Robertson, supra note 7 at 240-42. As to the latter, see
Airedale Trus, supra note 27 at 398, Lord Mustill and at 371, Lord Goff.
212 Peter, supra note 178; and Airedale Trust, supra note 27 at 398, Lord Mustill: "The
distressing truth which must not be shirked is that the proposed conduct is not in the best interest of
Anthony Bland, for he has no best interests of any kind."
213 Rhoden, supra note 7 at 397. This conclusion is supported by the decision in Auckland
Area Health Board, supra note 112, characterizing and treating patients cut off from contact with
their own bodies or their environment in the same fashion. An absence of response, as when the
patient is in a persistent vegetative state, is equated with a patient whose responses are largely
absent, but are also (to some unknowable extent) entirely inaccessible.
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like for that patient. We cannot truly take the patient's perspective. All
our inferences, imagination, empathy-and in the end, our
conclusions-are from the standpoint of we who are competent.
214
Pretending we are doing otherwise only obscures the awesomely difficult
decision to be made. It is essential to acknowledge forthrightly both the
standpoint and its limitations-the gaps it leaves.2 15
One of the most frequent criticisms levelled against a best
interests test is that it assumes there are identifiable, societally shared
criteria, or to put it another way, that a broad social understanding exists
by which to determine not only what is of benefit to a patient and what is
a burden, but also when that burden is excessive.216 The response of
many is that there "is no consensus in society about how the value of a
life is affected by loss of higher brain function, severe physical
deterioration, or unrelievable extreme pain."217 Buchanan and Brock
point out that any assessment of the patient's best interests must be
based on an underlying value system-a conception of what constitutes
"the good" for the patient (and in life more generally). They identify
three broad, widely recognized theories of well-being that both compete
and overlap:
1. hedonist theories, which focus on the person having conscious
experiences of a specified, positive sort;
214 As an oncologist noted poignantly in C.B. Wong & J. Swazey, eds., Dilemmas of Dying
Policies and Procedures for Decisions Not to Treat (Boston: G.K. Hall Medical Publishers, 1981) at
192-93, in the end, decisions regarding incompetent terminally ill patients are always made by the
"winners"--the healthy.
215 The difficulties in determining the current interests of an incompetent patient with only
minimal awareness are acknowledged at least implicitly by the proponents of this model themselves
when, in giving content to their standard, they suggest that where patients suffer from certain
conditions, such as severe and intractable pain or the onset of a persistent vegetative state,
treatment need not be provided if the families so request. Their criterion for inclusion on the list of
conditions for which continued treatment is elective, though, is that relative to which "wide
consensus already exists [that] ... certain states of being are not in a patient's interest," Dresser &
Robertson, supra note 7 at 241. The judgment they rely on, then, is the very one they themselves
reject (ibid at 238)-that of competent people, speaking from their own perspectives about what
constitutes a life that one would not want to continue.
216 See, for example, E.J. Emanuel, "A Communal Vision of Care for Incompetent Patients"
(1987) 17 Hastings Center Report 15 at 16.
21 7 L Tribe, Amedcan Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (Mineola: Foundation Press, 1988) at 1369.
See also Jobes, supra note 73 at 457-58, Handler, J. (concurring); and Airedale Trus supra note 27 at
381-82, Lord Browne-Wilkinson. A graphic illustration of this point can be found in J. Berger &
A.S. Berger, eds., To Die orNot to Die (New York: Praeger, 1990), drawing together perspectives on
this issue from different countries, cultures, and religions.
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2. preference or desire satisfaction theories, where "the good" for a
person is equated with having his or her desires or preferences
satisfied to the maximum extent possible over a lifetime; and
3. objective list theories, that hold some things to be good or bad
for a person independent of whether the person prefers them or
will have positive, conscious experiences of them.218
Decisions about the treatment choice that is in the patient's best
interests generally neither articulate the underlying choice as to the
values on which the determination is made, nor justify that choice over
other possibilities. Still, those underlying assumptions as to what
constitutes "the good" (and its absence) must be present0 19 Some
decisions are underpinned by a hedonistic theory of the good-avoiding
pain is all the court safely feels it can say is in the patient's best
interests.& 0 In other cases, courts have incorporated into their
assessment of the patient's best interests whatever could be gleaned of
what the patient would have wanted, an approach oriented by a
preference satisfaction view of "the good."221 Those who would argue
that there is value in preserving physical existence even when the patient
can no longer experience it or might actively not want it would be basing
their conclusion on a "list" of what is good for the person and for society
more generally.222
Not only does this observation regarding the lack of social consensus
undermine the legitimacy of a judicial decision purporting to identify the
218 Buchanan & Brock, supra note 115 at 31-33. There are, of course, a number of other
classification systems that have been proposed.
219 As Wilson, J. noted in her concurring judgment in Morgentaler, supra note 91 at 166: "The
idea of human dignity finds expression in almost every right and freedom guaranteed in the Charter.
Individuals are afforded the right to choose their own religion and their own philosophy of life, the
right to choose with whom they will associate and how they will express themselves, the right to
choose where they will live and what occupation they will pursue. These are all examples of the
basic theory underlying the Charter, namely that the state will respect choices made by individuals
and to the greatest extent possible, will avoid subordinating these choices to any one conception of
the good life." When a best interests test is employed, some vision of the good life must be chosen
for and imposed on another.
2 20 See, for example, Conroy, supra note 88 at 1243; for criticism see ibi at 1247-49, Handler
J. (concurring); in the United Kingdom, see Re B, [1981] 1 W.LR. 1421 at 1422 (CA.).
221 See, for example, Rasmussen, supra note 174 and Torres, supra note 169.
222 See, for example, J. Bopp & D. Avila, "Perspectives on Cruzan: The Sirens' Lure of
Invented Consent: A Critique of Autonomy-Based Surrogate Decision-Making for Legally-
Incapacitated Older Persons" (1991) 42 Hastings LU. 779; see also JJ. McCartney, "Right to Die:
Perspectives from Catholic and Jewish Traditions," in Berger & Berger, eds., supra note 217 at 22,
commenting on the belief of some Catholic theologians that remaining alive is never rightly
regarded as a burden.
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patient's best interests, in real terms it also means that the patient's best
interests as the patient or his or her community would perceive them
may well not be the values informing the judgment. There will always be
a line-drawing problem, and it is exacerbated by this plurality of views in
society. Indeed, the intensity of the debate on this subject itself
illustrates the diversity of deeplyheld views.2  Nor is this concern
vitiated by always leaning in favour of preserving life, of treating. One
may undervalue the life of an individual who cannot speak for himself;
on the other hand, one may also in unconscious and well-meaning
cruelty greatly underestimate the extent of the suffering and
deprivations experienced.224 Further, trying to make decisions purely on
the basis of "medical need" ignores the fact that concepts of medical
need presuppose a value judgment about the desirability of treatment.
225
Thus, even though the cases often reference values "long recognized" by
society or "ranking high in our scale of values" 226 or universally shared,
in a pluralistic society the best interests approach necessarily entails
223 Compare, for example, G. Grant, "The Language of Euthanasia," in G. Grant, Technology
and Justice (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986) at 103-17, arguing strongly for the
sanctity of life as the pre-eminent value; and J.E. Magnet & E.W. Kluge, Withholding Treatment
from Defective Newborn Children (Que.: Brown Legal Publ., 1986), arguing equally strongly that
judgments as to the quality of life must inform these decisions and that euthanasia can be justified
when that quality is not acceptable according to standards of due discernment.
224 See Minow, supra note 149 at 961. See also M. Somerville, "Pain and Suffering in
Medicine and Law" (1986) 36 U.T.LJ. 286 at 314 on relief of pain and suffering for incompetent
patients: "[t]here may in such cases be a brutal disregard for, and contravention of the feelings of
ihe person who cannot think but can still feel, that is, who can experience emotionally." Her
comments would seem equally applicable to the use of life support or life-prolonging treatment for
incompetent individuals.
225 In Airedale Trust, supra note 27, the House of Lords indicated physicians were the
appropriate decisionmakers with respect to the best interests of a patient in a persistent vegetative
state, provided they acted in accordance with a "responsible body of professional opinion."
Families were to be consulted but ought not be able to dictate to doctors; see, for example Lord
Goff at 373-74 (for a contrary view, see Lord Mustill at 399). On judgments of "medical need" see
generally D. Callahan, "Terminating Treatment: Age as a Standard" (1987) 17 Hastings Center
Report 21 at 24. See also N. Cantor, The Legal Frontiers ofDeath and Dying (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1987) at 54, noting that all medical decisions are infused with quality of life
considerations, although competent patients at least have the prerogative of making these value
judgments for themselves. Rhoden, supra note 7 at 430 suggests that the medical profession is
prone to reductionist presuppositions about what amounts to a "benefit" to the patient, based on a
"body-part-repair" orientation. For a decision sensitive to the need to take psychological,
emotional, and social as well as medical considerations into account, see Re P., supra note 160 at
142.
226 See, for example, Eve supra note 15 at 34 for use of this characterization relative to "the
importance of maintaining the physical integrity of a human being." In the context of life-sustaining
treatment, see Re P., ibi&at 143.
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imposing what may in fact be highly contested societal values on the
incompetent patient.
7. The best interests test applied
Although there are no Canadian cases directly on point, the
withdrawal or withholding of other types of potentially life-prolonging
medical treatment has been considered. Comments made in those cases
may indicate the analysis likely to be applied to this issue. On review,
they do raise a concern that in those instances when courts are involved
in life-support decisions for incompetent patients, they will go to the
other extreme from American courts and adopt something very close to
a vitalist position, almost always valuing the preservation of life above
all. The concern arises because in analogous cases where the withdrawal
or withholding of other types of potentially life-prolonging medical
treatment has been considered, it seems that the only factor that could
mitigate against continuing to treat would be severe, intractable pain and
suffering. Pain, however, can frequently be controlled, removing it as an
operative factor in the decision making.
For instance, in two decisions in Quebec and Ontario, courts
upheld parents' refusal of chemotherapy for their children suffering
from cancer.227 In both cases, the evidence established that the
proposed treatment would be extremely intrusive and painful, had
injurious side-effects, and could only marginally improve chances for
recovery, which were very poor in any event. On the other hand, in Re
Superintendent of Child and Family Services and Dawson,2 8 surgical
intervention to replace a shunt in an institutionalized severely
handicapped hydrocephalic child was authorized by the British
Columbia Supreme Court over the opposition of the parents. The
evidence in that case established that the operation would assure the
continuation of the child's life, characterized by the court as relatively
happy and not evidencing pain or suffering, and that if the operation
were not performed, the child might well suffer further deterioration,
227 Couture-Jacque4 supra note 79; Re L.D.K: Children's Aid Socieiy of Metropolitan Toronto v.
K and K (1986), 48 R.F.L. (2d) 164 (Ont. Prov. Ct.).
228 (1983), 145 D.L.R. (3d) 610 (B.C.S.C.), rev'g. (sub nom. Re S.D.) 42 B.C.L.R. 153 (Prov.
Ct) [hereinafter Dawson]. See also Goyette, supra note 85, authorizing a life-saving operation for a
child with Down's Syndrome over the parents' objection, and RB. and S.B., supra note 162,
authorizing treatment for meningitis for a severely mentally retarded and neurologically
handicapped ten-year-old child over the parents' objection that the child would never have any
quality of life.
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pain and distress, but would not necessarily die. The court distinguished
the situation before it from that of a terminally ill patient and the
question of whether there is a "right to die," and explicitly recognized
that there may be instances where the child's future will so certainly be
full of such pain and suffering that the court might reach a different
conclusion with respect to life-prolonging interventions.2 29 Extreme and
intractable pain was the only factor the judge explicitly noted might meet
what she called the "most coercive" standard that would justify
withholding treatment. 23 0
These decisions all concerned patients who were conscious,
interacting with others at some level, and connected with their
surroundings. Further, all three decisions concerned children, who
could not have developed a stable value system from which to identify
preferences. The presence or absence of pain and whether it could be
controlled were obviously significant factors in the patients' lives. And
in the first two decisions, it is a fair conclusion that the treatment would
most likely have staved off death for only a limited period of time at
best, if at all. The courts were not faced with the situation of a barely
conscious patient or one in a persistent vegetative state, where the
patient's ability to feel anything is non-existent or highly questionable
but where life could still be maintained for years. It may be that a court
confronting that type of situation would not exclude considerations other
than pain from its inquiries so absolutely.
Still, it would seem from these cases that our courts would regard
it as appropriate that life support seldom, and only in extreme
circumstances be withdrawn from incompetent patients. One need only
look to the very strong emphasis in Dawson on "the laws of our society
229 Dawson, id at 620 and at 623.
230 bid at 620 and at 623. It would follow from this comment that in the face of pain of that
nature and degree, the judge would be "choiceless"; the fact that there is a decision-a
choice-being made is obscured by the characterization of pain as a "coercive," choice-rcmoving
factor. This characterization of severe pain itself is, of course, dependent on one's underlying
choice as to what constitutes "the good" for a patient.
For a different, more encompassing sensibility, see Re P., supra note 160 at 156 and at 143,
where parents' refusal of a liver transplant for their child was upheld in the face of the government's
application to have the child declared in need of protection so that the operation could be
authorized. While the child's chances of survival with the transplant were good and death was
certain and imminent without it, the court noted that the child would always suffer serious side
effects, some of which were themselves potentially life-threatening, that the decision necessarily
involved not just medical considerations but important psychological, social, and emotional
components as well, and most importantly in the court's view, that the parents' decision was "made
totally within the bounds of current medical practice" and "did not depart" from values society
expects from parents of a terminally ill child.
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[being] structured to preserve, protect and maintain human life [such]
that in the exercise of our inherent jurisdiction this court could not
sanction the termination of a life except for the most coercive
reasons,"231 an emphasis that is echoed in Niemiec,23 2 or, although in a
very different context, the Supreme Court of Canada's choice in Eve of
"the importance of maintaining the physical integrity of a human
being"23 3 as the controlling value from among several others and its
hesitation to exercise its parens patriae jurisdiction to approve a
contentious step that would be irreversible.23 4 The tenor of these
comments lends support to the conclusion that, at least relative to non-
comatose, never-competent patients and once-competent patients who
never clearly expressed their wishes relative to the use or continuation of
life-sustaining medical interventions and who are not obviously near the
end of a process of dying (itself a contentious and slippery term), courts
may at least initially lean in favour of preserving life except in
circumstances of certain, intractable pain.23 5 While one can analyze this
result in terms of avoiding quality of life decisions for which there is no
consensus, or refusing to condone euthanasia, or avoiding a slippery
slope of incrementally more morally questionable decisions, at bottom it
is based on a sense that, as one judge put it, "the life of this [person] ...
is so imponderable that it would be wrong for her to be condemned to
die. ''23 6 Judges confronted with questions about foregoing life-
sustaining treatment will be keenly aware of their inability to know, their
inability to find facts of the type and in the ways they are used to relying
231 Dawson, supra note 228 at 620.
232 Supra note 28 at 427.
233 Eve, supra note 15 at 34.
2 34 bid. at 32-33.
235 The presence of ongoing, intractable pain combined with a poor prognosis was key in the
two decisions confirming parents' decisions not to force their children to undergo chemotherapy,
supra note 209. Relative to the considerations to be taken into account when a child is "... so
damaged as to have negligible use of its facilities," see In Re J, [1990] 3 All E.R. 930 at 944-45,
Taylor U. He posited discontinuing treatment only as an alternative to a pain-filled existence or
one in which the patient must be so heavily sedated as to lose consciousness in order to control pain.
Neither of the other two judges were so categorical. But see RB. and S.B., supra note 162, where
the court held that a child must be treated to prolong her life, even if doing so prolonged her
suffering. The judgment is very brief and neither describes the child's condition or prospects in any
detail nor expands on what is meant by "suffering." As such, it cannot be reliably factored into this
analysis. It is likely that the non-invasive, minimal, routine nature of the treatment in
question--antibiotic therapy-significantly affected the outcome as well.
236 Re B, supra note 220, quoted with approval in Dawson, supra note 228 at 623. For critical
comment on this choice of words, which has been termed "more emotive than accurate," see In Re J,
/bid at 942, Balcombe L. and at 944, Taylor U.
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on as trustworthy in a traditional adversarial proceeding. They will be
aware of the lack of a social consensus-a conventional morality-with
respect to many of these questions. Most of all, they will know that if a
court sanctions discontinuing life support, in all likelihood, that decision
will shortly be irreversible. Taking all these factors together, the result is
likely to be judgments rooted in caution that only rarely authorize an
irrevocable step of this nature.
8. Towards a theory of decision making
At the same time, these cases also recognize that there must be
some weighing of the burden to the patient against the benefit possible
or likely from the treatment-in other words, a quality of life
assessment, but within the patient's own frame of reference. Thus, in
Dawson, the court, quoting with approval from the decision of the
English Court of Appeal in Re B, recognized that there might be
circumstances in which "the life of this child is demonstrably going to be
so awful" that a life-saving operation need not be performed.237 It
would seem from this observation and the cases where treatment was not
ordered that Canadian courts are not committed to a firmly vitalist
position no matter what the cost to the individual. The position is not
one, then, that privileges the value of physical existence above all others;
there is a recognition that it is not always necessary or in the patient's
best interests to treat at all costs and with all measures available. 23 8
It is likely that the judges in Dawson and in Re B, sensitive to
criticisms of a "quality of life" approach, singled out pain and suffering
because the judges felt able to identify confidently these factors as
mitigating against continuing life within a broad, albeit not universal
societal agreement at the time and given the circumstances of these
patientsP 9 But these decisions do not mean that pain and suffering are
23 7 Supra note 220 at 623. More recently in England, see Re C, supra note 114, relative to
limits on treatment for a terminally ill child. See also In Re J, supra note 235 (an extremely
physically and mentally handicapped child who was not terminally ill need not be placed on a
ventilator again should the need arise. The decision was based on both the child's medical
prognosis with and without the life support and an assessment of what the child's experience of life
would be like with and without the treatment.) Re J, supra note 73 is to the same effect.
238 The decision inMalett, supra note 31 at 430 lends support to this conclusion as well in its
recognition that preserving the patient's life must be evaluated against the backdrop of her own
values.
23 9 For a similar comment in the American context, see Jobes, supra note 73 at 458, Handler
I. at note 12.
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the only factors that might persuade a court to authorize an end to life
support. Even if the notion of "pain and suffering" is read broadly to
include elements of mental and emotional suffering as well as pure
physical sensation (an interpretation the phrase legitimately and sensibly
bears), that does not seem exhaustive of what might make a life "so
awful" that non-existence is the better alternative, to use the Dawson
court's baseline 2 40 There are many patients in extreme circumstances
maintained on life support to whom a test hinging on the presence or
absence of pain is simply not applicable. Patients in a persistent
vegetative state, for example, do not experience pain-or anything
else.241 For these patients and for others, too, when pain is the only
factor that is "enough," it "eclipses a whole cluster of other human
values that have a proper place in the subtle weighing that will ultimately
determine how a life should end."242 Among the factors that an exclusive
pain requirement negates might be a strong personal disapproval of
artificially extended existence at the end of life, an abhorrence of
dependence on others, a high valuation of personal privacy and dignity,
and an ideal of bodily integrity rather than simply prolonging life.243
We live in a pluralistic society; we are not often going to be able
to claim universal consensus. There are grave dangers of abuse in
deciding to let a life end. At the same time, the question of withdrawing
life support can be better and more sensitively addressed than by
identifying only one example of what is intolerable, such as severe pain.
We can begin to develop a more encompassing standard or series of
considerations, motivated by a recognition that the life of one in a dire
condition need not be perpetuated where to do so entails destroying the
patient's dignity and denigrating his or her humanity.24 For these
2 40 Dawson, supra note 228 at 623. The English Court of Appeal seems to take something of
the same approach in its decisions; see Re C, supra note 114 at 979; and In Re J, supra note 235 at
938, Donaldson IU. and at 945, Taylor .J.
241 Peter, supra note 178 at 425; andAiredale T=us4 supra note 27 at 375, Lord Goff, at 361,
Lord Keith, and at 398, Lord Mustill. Further, the line between those in a persistent vegetative
state and those who are barely conscious is often not all that clear, see Rhoden, supra note 7 at 397.
242 Conroy, supra note 88 at 1247, Handler J. See also Emanuel, supra note 216, contrasting
the hedonistic conception of an acceptable existence for incompetent patients (using pain and pain
alone as the standard of definition for benefits and burdens), with other possible
standards-physical existence (vitalist), affective (human interaction), autonomy, and utilitarianism
(collective pain and pleasure).
243 Various American judges have given some indication of the range of factors that might be
important to a patient in the decision-making. See, for example, Conroy, supra note 88 at 1248,
Barber, supra note 167 at 493; and Jobes, supra note 73 at 462, Pollock J.
244 An approach suggested in Jobes, ibid. at 459, Handler J.
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patients, even if not otherwise near death, that fate can be "so awful"
that non-existence is the better alternative. The organizing principles in
the decision-making process, then, would be concepts of human dignity
and personal integrity that are contextualized to inform the
consideration of the patient's particular circumstances-for instance,
long-term constant and extensive handling of the insensate body of a
patient who has essentially no hope of recovery.2 45 The decision would
not be a purely medical judgment consigned to health care professionals
(even though expressed through the medium of a court), nor would it be
entirely legalistic; rather, it must be recognized as a social and moral one
as well.
This is a standard that could co-exist with the Supreme Court of
Canada's recognition in Eve of the primacy of the value of preserving
physical integrity, not just physical existence. Protecting personal
integrity (physical and mental) advances the core value of human
dignity. It is a standard that can encompass the element of pain and
suffering singled out in Dawson, without excluding many patients for
whom this factor would be irrelevant or insignificant-for instance, the
Karen Quinlans of the world. As with any standard, this one, too, calls
for an infusion of content and a drawing of lines on the basis of moral
judgments and social consensus on subjects relative to which strong
arguments have been made that there cannot be universal agreement in
modern society. While that observation is accurate in an absolute sense,
in many instances, one can attain an accurate sense of general social
mores-a shared notion of human dignity that can inform decisions as to
how we and others should be treated. The impossibility of complete
consensus will continue to require that courts err on the side of caution
in this area-the dangers of cruel, unthinking misjudgments are real. I
would still argue that when the realities of medical intervention for an
incompetent individual have become such as to offend the sensibilities of
a strong majority of people, when both humaneness in treatment and
human dignity are gone or greatly eroded as a result of medical
interventions,246 we can say and our courts, if called on, should say,
"enough."
245 An example drawn from Conroy, supra note 88 at 1250, Handler J. (dissenting).
246 For a critical view, see Dresser & Robertson, supra note 7 at 238, arguing that the
"offence," if there is any, is to competent observers and their concepts of dignified and respectful
treatment, but not necessarily to the gravely debilitated patient. In the end, though, they too rely on
the judgments of "competent observers." See discussion of their proposed "current interests" test,
supra note 216.
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By attempting to articulate a guiding principle to underlie and
support the significance accorded particular factors affecting the patient,
such as pain, the analysis is of necessity taken up a level of abstraction.
The standard is then open to the criticism that it lacks concrete,
determinate meaning, that it offers little more than pious generalities. If
the concepts of human dignity, integrity, and humaneness in treatment
were only considered in the abstract and in isolation, that criticism could
be telling. When these principles are applied to the patient's reality,
however, they can usefully guide the inquiry. When specifics are
considered, severe and intractable pain fits, as does the example of the
extremes of constant and extensive handling and manipulation of an
irrevocably declining patient's insensate body. There will be others as
well. Unless a purely vitalist posture is adopted in all cases-and there is
little support for that extreme a position-one will never be able to
achieve a precise set of rules. At least, though, one will know something
of what to look for, and why. It may be that the best we can do is not a
rule book but a touchstone, itself firmly planted in the realities of the
patient's particular situation.
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